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NEW THINGS UNDER THE SUN:  
HOW THE CFTC IS USING VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES TO EXPAND ITS JURISDICTION 
James Michael Blakemore* 
INTRODUCTION 
A decade has passed since Bitcoin solved a fundamental 
problem plaguing virtual currencies:1  How to ensure, without re-
sort to financial intermediaries or other trusted central authorities, 
that a unit of digital currency can be spent only once.2  In that 
* Partner at Ketsal PLLC. Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan Law School. For
thoughtful comments and conversations, I would like to thank Connie Chang, Joshua Garcia, 
Zachary Fallon, Diego Zambrano, Pandora Chang, participants in the Arkansas Law Review 
Symposium on the Evolving Regulation of Crypto, and the editors of the Arkansas Law Re-
view. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
Ketsal. 
1. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) typically uses the term “vir-
tual currency” (or, somewhat less commonly, “digital currency”) to describe the subset of 
digital assets to which it has laid jurisdictional claim, viewing “cryptocurrency” as “[o]ne 
prominent type of virtual currency.”  See, e.g., Retail Commodity Transactions Involving 
Virtual Currency, 82 FED. REG. 60335 (proposed Dec. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 1) (internal citations omitted).  The Commission has defined “virtual currency” as “any 
digital representation of value (a ‘digital asset’) that functions as a medium of exchange, and 
any other digital unit of account that is used as a form of a currency (i.e., transferred from 
one party to another as a medium of exchange); may be manifested through units, tokens, or 
coins, among other things; and may be distributed by way of digital ‘smart contracts,’ among 
other structures.”  See Retail Commodity Transactions Involving Certain Digital Assets [ 
https://www.cftc.gov/media/3651/votingdraft032420/download] 9-11 (March 23, 2020). 
Because this Article focuses on the CFTC and the treatment of virtual currencies under the 
commodities laws, it adopts the Commission’s terminology (“virtual currencies”) to refer to 
digital assets generally, other than cases where a meaningful distinction requires another 
term.  With respect to bitcoin specifically, this Article follows the convention of capitalizing 
references to the Bitcoin protocol or network and referring to the unit of currency with the 
lowercase “bitcoin.”  See, e.g., Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN.ORG, 
[https://perma.cc/Z6D2-AAHS] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).  
2. The pseudonymous creator of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, described the infamous
double-spending problem as follows: 
The problem [with electronic payment systems] of course is the payee can’t verify 
that one of the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to 
introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for 
double spending. . . . The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire 
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time, Bitcoin has inspired countless follow-on projects.  Some 
have attempted to improve the technology’s potential use for dig-
ital cash, by, for example, increasing the number of transactions 
processed per second3 or improving user privacy.4  Others have 
strayed further from Bitcoin’s original intent, building on block-
chain—Bitcoin’s central innovation—to enable distributed com-
puting and so-called smart contracting,5 decentralized lending,6 
governance,7 data storage,8 and digital collectibles,9 among oth-
ers.10  At the same time, regulators and scholars have struggled to 
keep pace.  A range of federal agencies has waded into the world 
of virtual currencies, often beginning by characterizing the assets 
as something recognizably within their authority (property, 
money, a commodity, a security, and so on).  And much of the 
scholarly discourse has run along a parallel track, as scholars have 
wrestled with the basic question of how legally to classify these 
money system depends on the company running the mint, with every transaction 
having to go through them, just like a bank. . . . [W]e propose a solution to the 
double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to 
generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions.  
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 2, 1 (2008), 
[https://perma.cc/WMC9-6994].  
3. See, e.g., BITCOIN CASH, [https://perma.cc/UT8T-M3Z4] (last visited Mar. 20,
2020) (“Bitcoin Cash brings sound money to the world, fulfilling the original promise of 
Bitcoin as ‘Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash.’”) 
4. See, e.g., KURT M. ALONSO, GETMONERO.ORG, ZERO TO MONERO: FIRST EDITION:
A TECHNICAL GUIDE TO A PRIVATE DIGITAL CURRENCY; FOR BEGINNERS, AMATEURS, 
AND EXPERTS 1-2 (June 26, 2018, version 1.0.0), [https://perma.cc/YCB5-VNX6].  
5. VITALIK BUTERIN, A NEXT-GENERATION SMART CONTRACT AND 
DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION PLATFORM 1 (Ethereum White Paper), 
[https://perma.cc/C7MT-JENS] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020). 
6. See, e.g., ROBERT LESHNER & GEOFFREY HAYES, COMPOUND: THE MONEY 
MARKET PROTOCOL 1-3 (Feb. 2019, version 1.0), [https://perma.cc/HV2L-ZNQ5]. 
7. See CHRISTOPH JENTZSCH, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 1 (Working Paper), [https://perma.cc/HW5D-WZH4] (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2020). 
8. See PROTOCOL LABS, FILECOIN: A DECENTRALIZED STORAGE NETWORK (July 19,
2017) (Working Paper), [https://perma.cc/WYC3-8R9S]. 
9. See CRYPTOKITTIES, CRYPTOKITTIES: COLLECTIBLE AND BREEDABLE CATS
EMPOWERED BY BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY, [https://perma.cc/GW38-K3WJ] (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2020).  
10. See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 313,
325-26 (2017) (compiling additional potential use cases, including ridesharing, domain reg-
istration, crowdfunding, document ownership, prediction markets, voting, and wine prove-
nance).
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new assets.11  In focusing, alongside government agencies, on 
questions of classification, however, the scholarship has ne-
glected an important aspect of the advent of virtual currencies: the 
way in which a regulator’s efforts to fit an utterly novel asset into 
a statutory definition so often not only define the asset but rede-
fine the definition itself.  The very uncertainty of a virtual cur-
rency’s classification—both legal and metaphysical—enables 
regulators not only to claim jurisdiction over that asset but also to 
reshape and broaden that jurisdiction.  Enthusiasts and entrepre-
neurs have proposed numerous use cases for blockchain and vir-
tual currencies.  Federal regulators, without saying as much, have 
put forward their own.  
Because our basic understanding of the nature of virtual cur-
rencies is still developing, much of the regulatory and scholarly 
conversation sensibly has focused on defining virtual currencies, 
usually with reference to well understood legal categories.  In the 
last half-decade, both scholars and regulators have begun the task 
of categorizing virtual currencies, aiming to situate them within 
existing laws and regulations.12  Scholars, for their part, variously 
have explored whether virtual currencies, legally speaking and 
depending on context, are best considered property,13 money,14 
commodities,15 stock,16 or securities.17  Others have analyzed spe-
cific blockchain applications vis-à-vis governments and the law, 
asking whether smart contracts might replace legal contracts,18 
11. See Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cryptocurrencies
in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813, 
814-15 (2014).
12. See, e.g., Katie Szilagyi, A Bundle of Blockchains? Digitally Disrupting Property
Law, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 9, 10-11 (2018); Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 11, at 814-15; 
Mitchell Prentis, Digital Metal: Regulating Bitcoin as a Commodity, 66 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 609, 611-12 (2015); Thomas Lee Hazen, Tulips, Oranges, Worms, and Coins – Virtual, 
Digital, or Crypto Currency and the Securities Laws, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 493, 495-96 
(2019); Carol R. Goforth, U.S. Law: Crypto Is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Secu-
rity, All at the Same Time, J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION (Forthcoming); Werbach & Cornell, su-
pra note 10, at 319; PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE 
LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018). 
13. See, e.g., Szilagyi, supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 11.
15. See, e.g., Prentis, supra note 12, at 611-12.
16. See, e.g., David J. Shakow, The Tax Treatment of Tokens: What Does It Betoken?,
PENN LAW: FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP (Aug. 3, 2017), [https://perma.cc/8G47-92W2]. 
17. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 12.
18. See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 10, at 319.
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whether governments might use blockchain technology as a 
means of regulation,19 and even whether the technology might 
displace the law altogether in broad swaths of life.20  Generally 
speaking, this dialogue centers on how people use or might use 
blockchain technology, and what that use means for the law’s 
treatment of blockchain.  A technology’s legal classification fre-
quently derives from its use,21 and commentators have noted that 
regulatory scrutiny of blockchain technology has tracked the de-
velopment of potential uses for the technology:22  Bitcoin’s use as 
digital money, for example, attracted early interest from the 
Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network23 
and the Internal Revenue Service,24 and the later proliferation of 
virtual currencies used as capital raising instruments invited the 
attention of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).25  Federal agencies recognize elements of their traditional 
subject matter in particular uses of blockchain technology.  Be-
cause classification—as a commodity, as a security, and so on—
so often underlies jurisdiction, the question of classification is of 
more than academic interest.  To legally classify a virtual cur-
rency is to determine who has authority over it, and federal agen-
cies, as a threshold matter, assert their jurisdiction via classifica-
tion.  
19. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 8-9.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-
2019-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS 
INVOLVING CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 7 (2019) (a virtual currency’s “label . . . 
is not dispositive of its regulatory treatment [and] . . . transactions denominated in [virtual 
currency] will be subject to FinCEN regulations regardless of . . . the type of technology 
utilized for the transmission of value.”).  See also SEC, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT 
CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS 1 n.6 (2019), [https://perma.cc/R7AJ-VWAG] 
(noting that “under the Howey test, ‘form [is] disregarded for substance and the emphasis 
[is] on economic reality.’”).  
22. Jerry Brito et. al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction
Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 152-55 (2014). 
23. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2013-
G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, 
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013). 
24. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938.
25. See Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, SEC (July 25, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/6KA4-WS3W]; see also Report of Investigation: The DAO, Exchange Act 
Release No. 81207, 117 SEC Docket 745 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO Report]. 
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The CFTC was among the earliest federal agencies to assert 
authority over virtual currencies by classifying them, in its case, 
as commodities, and ever since has acted as one of the keenest 
virtual currency market police.  The Commodity Exchange Act’s 
(CEA) definition of “commodity”26 is notably broad, and as early 
as 2014 the CFTC, noting that commodities underlie the agency’s 
jurisdiction, had located virtual currencies within it.27  On this ba-
sis, the CFTC took action against a number of virtual currency 
market participants, including an unregistered bitcoin option con-
tract trading platform,28 a bitcoin derivatives trading platform that 
engaged in wash trading and prearranged trades,29 an unregistered 
leveraged bitcoin trading platform,30 and the perpetrator of a vir-
tual currency Ponzi scheme.31  The CFTC also issued proposed 
guidance on the difference between derivative and spot markets 
in the virtual currency context,32 a question central to the scope of 
its authority over virtual currency transactions,33 as well as a “pri-
mer” on risks of and the CFTC’s role in virtual currency markets34 
and a “backgrounder” on the process for self-certifying bitcoin 
26. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2010).
27. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Effective Enforcement and the Fu-
ture of Derivatives Regulation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 
113th Cong. 55 (2010) (testimony of Timothy Massad, Chairman, CFTC) [hereinafter Mas-
sad Testimony].   
28. See In the Matter of: Coinflip, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 15-29, 2015 WL 5535736,
at *1 (Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Coinflip]. 
29. In the Matter of: TeraExchange LLC, CFTC No. 15–33, 2015 WL 5658082, at *1
(Sept. 24, 2015) [hereinafter TeraExchange]. 
30. In the Matter of: BFXNA INC. d/b/a BITFINEX, CFTC Docket No. 16-19, 2016
WL 3137612, at *1 (June 2, 2016) [hereinafter Bitfinex]. 
31. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and for Civil Monetary Pen-
alties Under the Commodity Exchange Fact and Commission Regulations at 1, Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., No. 17-7181, 2018 WL 6320656 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018).  
32. Retail Commodity Transactions Involving Virtual Currency, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,335
(proposed Dec. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1). The CFTC issued Final Inter-
pretive Guidance concerning retail commodity transactions in virtual currency in March of 
2020. See CFTC, RETAIL COMMODITY TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING CERTAIN DIGITAL 
ASSETS (2020), [https://perma.cc/JSH7-XJDQ].  
33. See infra Part III.
34. CFTC, A CFTC PRIMER ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2017), 
[https://perma.cc/GTC4-JHGF]; see also Customer Advisory: Understand the Risks of Vir-
tual Currency Trading, CFTC, [https://perma.cc/D6KX-8B8T] (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).  
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derivative products.35  Elemental to each of these assertions of ju-
risdiction was the claim, often explicit but not fully developed or 
supported, that bitcoin and other virtual currencies are commodi-
ties under the CEA.  Because the majority of these actions took 
the form of either settlement orders or statements by the CFTC, 
the agency did not have to provide support for its position.  Only 
when defendants resisted the classification of specific virtual cur-
rencies as commodities, forcing the CFTC to make its case in 
court in CFTC v. McDonnell36 and CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, 
Inc.,37 did the CFTC have to defend and elaborate on its claim.  
This Article approaches these virtual currency classificatory 
debates from a different angle: focusing on the CFTC’s activity 
in the virtual currency arena, it shows how the CFTC’s efforts to 
fit virtual currencies within the CEA’s definition of “commodity” 
serve not only to define virtual currencies (the focus of so much 
industry, scholarly, and regulatory discussion) but also to redefine 
the scope of the law, including new powers granted to the CFTC 
in the wake of the Great Recession.  The CFTC primarily regu-
lates futures and other derivatives.38  It also has long had the au-
thority to prosecute manipulation in the commodity spot mar-
kets.39  Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) low-
ered the evidentiary burden for commodity manipulation cases 
and prohibited, in addition to manipulation, fraud in connection 
with a “contract of sale of any commodity in interstate com-
merce.”40  The power Dodd-Frank arguably conferred on the 
CFTC is extraordinary.  Read to the extreme, the CFTC’s author-
ity to prosecute fraud is limitless.41  To the extent that the CEA, 
35. CFTC Backgrounder on Self-Certified Contracts for Bitcoin Products, CFTC,
[https://perma.cc/T9RK-H79D] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020). 
36. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217
(E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
37. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d
492, 494 (D. Mass. 2018). 
38. See Retail Commodity Transactions Involving Virtual Currency, 82 Fed. Reg.
60,335, 60,336 (proposed Dec. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
39. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 217.
40. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2011).
41. That the fraud must be perpetrated in connection with interstate commerce is a
small limit in practice.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995) (in-
ternal citations omitted) (noting Congress may regulate intrastate economic activity 
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as amended by Dodd-Frank, maintained any limits on this power, 
the CFTC has taken advantage of virtual currency’s novelty and 
murky regulatory status to blur those limits.  In particular, the 
CFTC has used virtual currency to assert an expansive vision of 
the definition of a commodity (the basis for the CFTC’s jurisdic-
tion in a given matter) and of its fraud power in the spot markets. 
This Article unfolds in four parts.  Part I explains how his-
torically commodities regulation has primarily taken aim not at 
commodities themselves but at futures and other derivatives con-
tracts that reference those commodities, usually out of fear of the 
ability of derivatives contracts to distort the spot markets for those 
same commodities.  In the United States, while federal commod-
ities regulation has always focused on futures contracts and other 
derivatives, the CFTC has also long enjoyed the authority to po-
lice manipulation in the underlying spot markets.  In 2010, Dodd-
Frank expanded the CFTC’s spot market powers to include new 
anti-fraud authority and expanded anti-manipulation authority.  
Part II traces how bitcoin, the earliest and most prominent virtual 
currency, became a commodity under the CEA definition, and ex-
plains how that transformation elucidates the commodity defini-
tion itself.  Utterly new commodities are relatively uncommon 
any longer, and virtual currencies themselves present an increas-
ingly rare opportunity to test the edges of the CEA’s commodity 
definition. 
Part III examines the CFTC’s efforts to expand its police 
powers in the commodity spot markets on two fronts: via the com-
modity definition and by decoupling its anti-fraud from its anti-
manipulation authority.  While the history and text of the CEA 
demonstrate that a connection to the CFTC’s traditional pur-
view—the futures markets—limits both the definition of a “com-
modity” and the CFTC’s authority to police fraud in the underly-
ing spot markets, the CFTC has effectively harnessed virtual 
currencies to push these areas of its authority to their limits.  Vir-
tual currency has played a prominent role in the CFTC’s push, on 
the one hand, to bring literally every asset imaginable into the 
substantially affecting interstate commerce, including intrastate coal mining, extortionate 
credit transactions, restaurants using interstate supplies, hotels with interstate guests, and 
production and consumption of homegrown wheat).   
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commodity definition, and, on the other, to establish the CFTC’s 
power to prosecute spot market fraud whether or not the fraud has 
a manipulative effect on commodity spot or futures contract 
prices.  The regulatory and ontological uncertainty surrounding 
virtual currencies make them particularly susceptible to, and use-
ful for, this so-called regulatory creep.42  
Finally, Part IV shows how the CFTC’s virtual currency suc-
cesses have already begun to bear fruit in arenas beyond virtual 
currency, and reflects on virtual currency’s seemingly unique sus-
ceptibility to and attractiveness for the expansion of regulatory 
powers.  The authority-expanding theories the CFTC explored in 
the context of virtual currencies, and which the unique character-
istics of virtual currencies helped establish, have already made 
their way to other areas of the CFTC’s purview and likely will 
continue to have ramifications both for virtual currencies specifi-
cally and the CFTC’s power generally.  To be clear, this Article 
does not make the claim that the CFTC acts inappropriately when 
it advocates for broad readings of its powers.  To the contrary, 
like other government agencies, the CFTC faces enormous pres-
sures to maximize its jurisdictional reach and has an obligation to 
zealously pursue its mandate.  Instead, this Article explores how 
the CFTC has capitalized on virtual currencies to push, and how 
virtual currencies help to delineate, the limits of the law.  
I. FEDERAL COMMODITY REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 
The relationship between commodity derivative and spot 
markets has often formed the basis of regulation, and has done so 
in the United States in two ways: First, Congress has granted com-
modities regulators authority primarily in the derivatives markets, 
typically due to the perceived influence of those markets over the 
42. See William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives:
The Need for a Comparative Institution Report, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 122 (1995) (“One result 
of the incentives that regulators have to expand their domain, protect themselves from blame, 
and make their enforcement efforts easy is regulatory creep—the expansion of regulation 
into areas where, from an efficiency perspective, it is not needed.”); Dan Awrey, Regulating 
Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. 
L. 273, 295 (2011) (“The potential absence of sufficient certainty and predictability also
raises the prospect of ‘regulatory creep.’”).
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underlying spot markets; second, to the extent Congress has also 
granted the CFTC spot market powers, including longstanding 
anti-manipulation authority, it has done so to supplement the 
CFTC’s regulatory oversight of the derivatives markets.  Part I.A 
briefly explains the difference between spot markets and futures 
and other derivatives markets and the commonly understood in-
fluence of one on the other, and rehearses the more common jus-
tifications for the existence (and legal authorization) of deriva-
tives markets, before providing a few historical examples of 
regulation premised on the perceived interrelationship between 
the two markets.  Part I.B lays out a short history of the advent 
and development of federal commodities regulation in the United 
States, from the first federal commodities laws to the establish-
ment of the CFTC, and culminating in Dodd-Frank’s expansion 
of the CFTC’s spot market powers.  
A. The Interconnectedness of Spot and Futures Markets
The commodity markets, broadly speaking, take two forms:
spot (or cash) markets and derivatives markets.  In spot markets, 
market participants buy and sell physical commodities today, or 
“on the spot.”43  In derivatives markets, by contrast, parties place 
bets on a commodity’s future value or behavior.44  The contracts 
setting forth the terms of these bets are known as derivative con-
tracts because their value is “derivative” on that anticipated value 
or behavior.45  Futures contracts, an early and common form of 
43. Market, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The CFTC staff has defined
“spot transactions” as those in which “delivery of the product and immediate payment for 
the products are expected on or within a few days of the trade date.” CFTC No-Action Letter, 
CFTC LTR No. 98-73, 1998 WL 754623, *2 (Oct. 8, 1998).  The Supreme Court has defined 
“spot transactions” as “agreements for purchase and sale of commodities that anticipate near-
term delivery.” Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 472 (1997).  
44. Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011). 
45. See Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter De-
rivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1299 (2010) (“[D]erivatives are complex financial 
contracts in which one party pays another party if ‘something’ happens in the future. . . . 
‘[A]nything that can be quantified and objectively verified can be the subject of a deriva-
tive.’”) (internal citations omitted).  
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derivative, are agreements to buy or sell a commodity at a future 
point for a set price.46  
Like other derivatives, futures contracts can be thought of as 
wagers.47  Imagine oil is selling today for $50 a barrel.  Imagine, 
too, an airline company that knows it will require oil to fuel its 
fleet in the coming year but believes the price of oil, and therefore 
the cost of operating its business, is set to rise.  Imagine, finally, 
a speculator who disagrees with the airline’s prediction, believing 
instead that the price of oil will fall in the coming year.  The spec-
ulator might agree to sell the airline 100 barrels of oil one year 
from today for $50 a barrel.  The speculator is betting that the 
price of oil will fall below $50 a barrel (if, in a year, a barrel of 
oil sells for $40, the speculator will sell each barrel to the airline 
for $10 more than the prevailing market price); the airline, on the 
other hand, is betting the price of oil will rise above $50 a barrel 
(if the price of oil ends up at $60 a barrel, the airline will buy its 
100 barrels at a discount).  When such contracts are standardized 
and traded on exchanges, they are known as futures contracts.48  
Of course, gambling is destructive—it redistributes existing value 
rather than creating it, and the associated transaction costs mean 
its value to society is net negative—and it increases the amount 
of risk faced by all participants in a system.49  As with gambling, 
many have warned of the dangers posed by speculative trading in 
derivatives, including those who locate the origin of the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis in such trading.50  If futures and other derivatives 
trading poses such risks, why does the law permit it?  
Economists and others who would justify the existence of 
derivatives markets, and in particular futures markets, typically 
46. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993) (“A ‘futures con-
tract,’ or “future,’ never precisely defined by statute, nevertheless . . . . [I]s generally under-
stood to be an executory, mutually binding agreement providing for the future delivery of a 
commodity on a date certain where the grade, quantity, and price at the time of delivery are 
fixed.  To facilitate the development of a liquid market in these transactions, these contracts 
are standardized and transferrable.”). 
47. See Lynn A. Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-
Regulating Them Can Prevent Another, CORNELL LAW: FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP 5 (Jan. 1, 
2009), [https://perma.cc/43A5-H6PJ] (“[Derivatives] are simple bets on the future—nothing 
less, and nothing more.”). 
48. Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 971.
49. Stout, supra note 44, at 13-14.
50. See, e.g., id.; Baker, supra note 45.
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highlight two services these markets purportedly provide: hedg-
ing and price discovery.51  Insurance, a familiar concept, helps 
elucidate the first service—hedging—as well as derivatives gen-
erally. Insurance is itself a type of derivative.52  Fire insurance is 
a homeowner’s bet that her house will burn down and the insur-
ance company’s bet that it will not.53  The homeowner, exposed 
to the risk that her home will burn down, offsets—hedges 
against—that risk by entering into an insurance contract with the 
insurance company.54  In this way, derivatives allow risk-averse 
parties to shift risk to others better situated or more willing to bear 
that risk, usually for a fee, just as the insurance company charges 
the homeowner a premium for taking on the risk of her home 
burning down.55  
Commodities merchants have long used futures markets as 
insurance against the often-unpredictable fluctuations in the price 
of commodities.56  Producing, processing, distributing, or other-
wise dealing in commodities exposes a business to the risk that 
the price of a commodity the business requires will rise or that the 
business wishes to sell will fall.57  To take a classic example, a 
corn farmer might wish to sell his crop today at today’s prices, 
despite the fact that he will not harvest it for many months.58  If, 
due to forces beyond the farmer’s control or ken, corn prices have 
crashed by harvest time, the farmer will sell his crop at a reason-
able price and keep his farm.  If, on the other hand, at harvest the 
51. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 44, at 7, 10; Timothy E. Lynch, Coming Up Short: The
United States’ Second-Best Strategies for Corralling Purely Speculative Derivatives, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 545, 561 (2014) (“Derivatives markets are often praised for their ability 
to provide price discovery.”).  Indeed, the CEA itself justifies derivatives by referencing their 
hedging and price discovery functions.  See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (stating that commod-
ities derivatives transactions “provid[e] a means for managing and assuming price risks, dis-
covering prices, or disseminating pricing information”). 
52. Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 447,
455 (2016) (“To the rancher, the futures exchange provides insurance or a hedge.”); Stout, 
supra note 44, at 7. 
53. Stout, supra note 44, at 7.
54. Id.
55. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Stout,
supra note 44, at 7, 14. 
56. Verstein, supra note 52, at 453-55.
57. Wayne D. Greenstone, The CFTC and Government Reorganization: Preserving
Regulatory Independence, 33 BUS. LAW. 163, 173 (1977). 
58. Baker, supra note 45, at 1299.
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price of corn has risen, the farmer will have sold his corn at a price 
he can live with, and the money he will have left on the table is 
the cost of not losing the farm.  Hedgers can also hedge more in-
directly—the farmer might, for example, hedge against the possi-
bility of drought destroying the value of his crop via a weather-
based derivative.59  The same is true of the pencil maker exposed 
to the fluctuating price of wood, the soda company that packages 
its product in aluminum cans, the oil-burning airline in the exam-
ple above, or any other number of companies whose product is or 
incorporates a commodity.60  The derivatives markets are often 
criticized for their use for economically destructive speculation,61 
but the exposure of these companies to the commodities markets 
means that not taking hedging positions in the derivatives markets 
is itself an economically dangerous speculative act.62  The airline 
that makes no bets in the oil futures markets is, in effect, betting 
that the price of oil will fall, or go no higher.  But what about the 
gambling speculator without a company or other productive stake 
in the commodities markets?  To the extent pure speculators, as 
opposed to hedgers, enter into the hedging justification, the law 
permits their presence, in part, as providers of liquidity, acting as 
the counterparties to the positions taken by businesses and others 
seeking to hedge their risk.63  Without speculators, the argument 
goes, the airline could not hedge its risk because there would be 
no one to take the airline’s bet.  
The second public good futures markets purportedly pro-
mote—price discovery—is “the process by which trading in a 
market incorporates new information and market participants’ ex-
pectations into asset prices.”64  Price discovery does not uniquely 
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Greenstone, supra note 57, at 174 (“By taking a position in the futures
market approximately equal and opposite from that taken in the cash market, the losses in-
curred in one market will be offset by gains in the other. The commercial firm is thus able to 
establish a price for a commodity, or the commodity component of a product, and fix its raw 
material costs. It no longer matters in which direction price moves, since any fluctuation has 
been neutralized by the equal and opposite transaction.”).  
61. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 44, at 8-10.
62. Greenstone, supra note 57, at 176.
63. Lynch, supra note 51, at 561, 567.
64. Christopher L. Culp, The Social Functions of Financial Derivatives, in FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: PRICING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 58 (Robert W. Kolb & James A. Overdahl 
eds., 2010). 
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occur in futures markets; all markets, including the spot markets 
underlying commodity derivatives markets, incorporate supply 
and demand information to determine the appropriate price for a 
given asset.65  But many argue that futures markets, due to their 
higher volume and greater liquidity, assimilate more, better infor-
mation faster and more accurately than physical commodity mar-
kets.66  An example helps show why this might be the case.  Trade 
in, say, oil is encumbered by shipping and storage costs—by the 
physicality of the commodity.  If you want to own oil, you’ll 
likely need to own barrels and tankers; to employ people to pilot 
and look after the tankers; you’ll need to pay for a place to park 
your oil.67  Because trade in oil futures is not similarly restrained 
and includes not only market participants who need oil but also 
speculators who don’t, the thinking goes, oil futures trade faster 
and more frequently and are therefore better able to incorporate 
information affecting the price of oil.  Moreover, because the fu-
tures markets take in, digest, analyze, and summarize all infor-
mation presently available about a specific commodity to produce 
the anticipated (i.e., future) spot price of that commodity on a par-
ticular date in the future, futures markets discover and dissemi-
nate price information regarding not only futures prices but also 
the appropriate spot price.68  In other words, in gathering the col-
lective wisdom of the markets to foretell future prices, the futures 
markets also necessarily reveal the market’s present view of a 
commodity’s value today.69  
The futures and spot markets are inextricable, and for this 
reason governments have often regulated one with a view to its 
65. Lynch, supra note 51, at 562-63.
66. See id. at 564; Stout, supra note 44, at 10, 30-31; Greenstone, supra note 57, at
172. 
67. The recent unprecedented fall below zero of certain oil futures contracts caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic underscores both the interrelation between futures and spot prices 
and the cost of having no place to put your oil when delivery comes due.  See Catherine Ngai, 
et al., Oil Plunges Below Zero for First Time in Unprecedented Wipeout, BLOOMBERG, 
(April 19, 2020), [https://perma.cc/T7DL-YKGM].  
68. Lynch, supra note 51, at 562-63; Greenstone, supra note 60.
69. Lynch, supra note 51, at 563; Greenstone, supra note 60, at 165.  Detractors have
suggested reasons for doubting both the hedging liquidity and price discovery justifications 
for derivatives markets, in particular in the case of speculative use of these markets and in 
over-the-counter markets.  See, e.g., Stout, supra note 44, at 30-31; Lynch, supra note 51, at 
564-66.
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effects on the other.  Logically, the price of a commodity today 
tells you something about its likely price in the future, and vice 
versa.  Businesses use futures markets not only to hedge their ex-
posure to commodity price movements but also as a guide for a 
multitude of business decisions.  The prices discovered by the fu-
tures markets provide businesses with a benchmark at which to 
buy, sell, and transfer commodities today.70  They also allow busi-
nesses to plan how they will allocate their resources, “mak[ing] 
more informed consumption, production, investment, financing, 
contracting, and marketing decisions.”71  Futures prices act as 
“one of the major guideposts for the economy in allocating re-
sources,”72 leading many to view the futures markets as a “public 
good.”73  These benefits only exist because of the strong connec-
tion between the futures and spot markets.74  
Not everyone holds so rosy a view of the futures markets, 
however, and as long as organized futures markets have existed, 
farmers, merchants, and governments have blamed them for dis-
tortions in the cash markets.  Just as the theoretical benefits of the 
futures markets depend on the interrelationship between the fu-
tures and spot markets, futures market detractors focus on the 
ability of the futures markets to affect spot market prices, either 
viewing the futures markets as inherently distortionary or as ripe 
targets for manipulators looking to affect one market by manipu-
lating another.75  As a result, for as long as organized futures mar-
kets have existed, governments have attempted to rein in, or even 
harness, the distortions thought to emanate from them.  In eight-
eenth century Japan, for example, the Tokugawa shogunate au-
thorized the first government-sanctioned futures exchange, the 
70. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 165-66.
71. Lynch, supra note 51, at 564.
72. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 173.
73. Lynch, supra note 51, at 564.  See also Verstein, supra note 52 (“Price discovery
and price signals are essential to a market society.”). 
74. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 165.  The connection also enables common types of
commodities manipulation.  See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation 
Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357, 366 (2013).
75. See, e.g., Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Since
the prices of futures are contingent on the vagaries of both the production of the commodity 
and the economics of the marketplace, they are particularly susceptible to manipulation and 
excessive speculation.”).  
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Dojima Rice Exchange, because it believed that trading in rice 
futures would artificially inflate the value of the underlying rice.76  
In the late nineteenth century in the United States, fears about the 
effect of futures markets on commodity prices led to repeated at-
tempts to outlaw futures trading altogether.77  Virtual currency 
markets provide their own fascinating example: The CFTC re-
portedly used bitcoin futures to pop 2017’s astonishing virtual 
currency spot market bubble.78  According to then-CFTC Chair-
man J. Christopher Giancarlo, the CFTC approved bitcoin futures 
as a way of introducing skepticism into an exuberant bitcoin spot 
market, whose prices were at their all-time high.79  Per Giancarlo, 
the plan worked, and the bitcoin bubble burst.80  
76. Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2574, 2582-83 (2000). The shogunate hoped higher rice prices would curry favor
with the military, who were paid in the commodity, and influential feudal lords, who used
rice to repay certain loans.  Id.  Derivatives contracts long predated sanctioned derivatives
exchanges, having existed since at least the time of Babylonia, where merchants made loans
to traders contingent on the successful arrival of the caravan carrying their goods, charging
a higher-than-usual interest rate to compensate for the risk that the caravan or goods were
lost to the desert, marauders, or other dangers.  LAURENT L. JACQUE, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES 
DEBACLES: FROM THEORY TO MALPRACTICE 4 (2010). The underlying spot markets are
older still—indeed, the oldest in the world.  Verstein, supra note 52, at 453.
77. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 178.  See also Stout, supra note 44, at 11-14 (Eight-
eenth and nineteenth century American common law declined to enforce speculative deriv-
ative contracts, including because speculators in the derivatives markets might be tempted 
to manipulate the spot markets and because speculative derivates posed systemic risk to the 
commodity markets).  
78. Brady Dale, Trump Administration Popped 2017 Bitcoin Bubble, Ex-CFTC Chair
Says, COINDESK (Oct. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/F9MQ-D446]. 
79. Id.
80. Id.  Giancarlo’s story offers another example of a theoretical justification for the
role of speculators in derivatives markets.  Giancarlo’s argument runs as follows: The bitcoin 
spot markets largely required participants to own bitcoin.  Id.; see also Stout, supra note 44, 
at 7 (“Speculating in the . . . [commodity] “spot” markets . . . requires a speculator to actually 
buy and hold” the commodity.).  Owning bitcoin, in turn, required a familiarity with the 
technology that Bitcoin adherents were more likely to possess, leading the spot market price 
to reveal not the market’s view of bitcoin’s value but instead Bitcoin evangelists’ view of 
the value of bitcoin—which was exaggerated.  Only when bitcoin derivatives allowed for 
Bitcoin skeptics to express their views (by betting against or “shorting” bitcoin) without 
having to own bitcoin or learn anything about the technology did the bubble built by the 
Bitcoin believers burst.  Dale, supra note 77.  
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B. A Brief History of Futures Regulation in the United
States 
Federal commodities laws in the United States have tradi-
tionally taken aim at futures rather than spot markets, in particular 
manipulation of the futures markets and its potential to affect the 
underlying spot markets.  In the early twentieth century, farmers 
and commodity dealers suspected that futures market speculation 
and manipulation were to blame for waning commodity prices 
and other market ills.81  In response, Congress produced the Fu-
ture Trading Act of 1921—promptly struck down as an improper 
use of the taxing power82—and then the Grain Futures Act of 
1922.83  As their names suggest, these early laws focused not on 
spot market transactions but on trading in futures and other deriv-
atives. The Grain Futures Act was not given its current, somewhat 
misleading title—the Commodity Exchange Act—until 1936.84 
Congress did not create the CFTC until many years later but, 
as with the earliest iterations of the federal commodities law, trou-
ble in the spot markets led to the creation of an agency whose 
primary mission is the regulation of the U.S. derivatives markets.  
The CFTC owes its existence to anchovies—or, rather, a lack of 
anchovies.85  The Peruvian anchoveta has a claim to being, in eco-
nomic terms, the most important fish in the sea.86  No wild fish is 
harvested in greater quantities,87 and the fish is one of the world 
81. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 970 (4th Cir. 1993); Stout, supra note
44, at 17; John H. Stassen, The Commodity Exchange Act in Perspective: A Short and Not-
So-Reverent History of Futures Trading Legislation in the United States, 39 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 825, 829 (1982).
82. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-69 (1922).
83. In his opinion striking down the Future Trading Act, Chief Justice Taft suggested
that the act might have passed constitutional muster had Congress had the “commerce clause 
in mind” rather than the taxing power. Id. at 68-69. Taking this cue, Congress tried again in 
the Grain Futures Act, this time successfully relying on the commerce clause. Stassen, supra 
note 81, at 830; Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1923).  
84. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1491. See also Stassen, supra note 81,
at 832. 
85. Stassen, supra note 81, at 833.
86. Cf. H. BRUCE FRANKLIN, THE MOST IMPORTANT FISH IN THE SEA: MENHADEN
AND AMERICA 205-217 (2007) (making the case for bunker or the menhaden). 
87. T. Iwamoto et al., ENGRAULIS RINGENS. THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED 
SPECIES (2010), [https://perma.cc/Z6J4-5SCH]. 
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economy’s primary sources of feed for livestock.88  When, in 
1972, the anchoveta schools failed to turn up off the coast of Peru, 
ranchers and merchants had to draw on other sources to feed the 
world’s livestock.89  The anchovies had bad timing.  They joined, 
in the words of the chairman of one of the oldest and most im-
portant futures exchanges in the world, an “extraordinary coinci-
dence of global events which suddenly wiped out the last of dwin-
dling grain surpluses and plunged the world into severe shortages 
of food.”90  Food prices soared, inviting congressional scrutiny.91  
Although the specter of futures market speculation and manipu-
lation drove much of the congressional agenda, Congress did not 
ultimately find that the futures markets were to blame.92  None-
theless, the hubbub ended in the creation of the CFTC, providing 
one more example of the tendency of problems in the spot mar-
kets to result in greater regulation of the derivatives markets.93  
In the years that followed, the federal commodities laws un-
derwent several additional series of significant revisions to ex-
pand or limit the CFTC’s jurisdiction over derivatives trading94 
before arriving at the current compilation of the federal commod-
ities laws, an amended Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).95  The 
CEA, like its predecessors and in spite of its name, concerns itself 
with regulation of the derivatives markets and has very little to 
say about commodities qua commodities.96  To the extent that the 
CEA confers power over the commodities referenced by futures 
and derivatives contracts, it does so in service of the Act’s regu-
lation of the derivatives markets.97  The link between spot market 
88. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 180; Small Business Problems Involved in the Mar-
keting of Grain and Other Commodities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Spec. Small Bus. 
Problems of the Permanent Select Comm. on Small Bus., 93rd Cong. 135 (1973) (testimony 
of Frederick G. Uhlmann, Chairman of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago) [herein-
after Hearings].  
89. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RECORDS PT. 1, THE SOYBEAN PHENOMENON 5-8
(1974). 
90. Hearings, supra note 88, at 135.
91. Greenstone, supra note 57, at 177.
92. Id. at 177-79, 181.
93. See id. at 181, 185-86.
94. Stout, supra note 44, at 17-18.
95. See id.
96. Stassen, supra note 81, at 832.
97. The CEA’s “purpose” is to “serve the public interest[]” of “providing a means for
managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information 
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prices and futures prices means that manipulation in the spot mar-
ket can lead to outsized gains in the futures markets.98  From the 
manipulator’s perspective, who controls a commodity in the pre-
sent controls the commodity’s future, transforming the business 
of betting on the future from a gamble into a sure thing.99  Anti-
manipulation power in the spot markets has thus long been under-
stood to be a supplement necessary to the effective regulation of 
the futures markets.100  
Although the CFTC has had anti-manipulation power in the 
spot markets since its creation,101 for many years the CFTC had 
little success prosecuting spot market manipulation cases.  It’s 
one thing for a statute to grant a power in the abstract.  It’s another 
thing entirely to successfully exercise that power in concrete 
cases.  Manipulative activity is often indistinguishable from legit-
imate market behavior102—the defining difference is a showing of 
through trading in liquid, fair and financially secure [derivatives] trading facilities.”  Com-
modities Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).  The deterrence and prevention of fraud 
and price manipulation, which disrupt market integrity, serve to further this purpose.  7 
U.S.C. § 5(b).  See also Prime Int’l Trading v. BP P.L.C., 937 F.3d 94, 107 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(citing CEA’s enumerated purpose); Greenstone, supra note 57, at 177 (internal citations 
omitted) (“The primary role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in this process 
is to protect the economic utility of the futures markets by ensuring the integrity of futures 
prices by making certain that price actually does reflect anticipated supply and demand.”); 
Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 970 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Because the [CEA] was 
aimed at manipulation, speculation, and other abuses that could arise from the trading in 
futures contracts and options, as distinguished from the commodity itself, Congress never 
purported to regulate ‘spot’ transactions (transactions for the immediate sale and delivery of 
a commodity).”). See also CFTC v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 321 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Salomon).  
98. See Stout, supra note 44, at 28 (“[D]erivatives markets . . . [allow for bets] that are
an order of magnitude larger than the spot market itself [including, for example,] . . . $10 
trillion in derivative contracts on a $1 trillion market for mortgage bonds, just as a bookie 
can take in $100,000 in bets on a horserace with a $10,000 winner’s purse.”).  For manipu-
lative strategies available to exploit this aspect of relationship between the spot and futures 
markets, see Abrantes-Metz et. al., supra note 74, at 366-69.  
99. See Stout, supra note 44, at 137.
100. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2010) (making it unlawful for “[a]ny person to manipulate
or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce”); 7 U.S.C. § 5. 
In the virtual currency context, see CFTC Backgrounder on Oversight of and Approach to 
Virtual Currency Futures Markets, CFTC, 4 (Jan. 4, 2018), [https://perma.cc/9XNA-GHHC] 
(justifying heightened review of virtual currency derivatives in part by reference to enhanced 
ability to police underlying virtual currency spot markets for fraud and manipulation).   
101. See 7 U.S.C. § 13.
102. See, e.g., Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on
Dealing with Market Manipulation, 8 YALE J. REG. 391, 392 (1991) (“[D]rawing a line be-
tween healthy economic behavior” and manipulation is difficult and imprecise.).  
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illicit intent103—and manipulation cases have proven difficult to 
prosecute.  In fact, in the first 35 years of its existence, the CFTC 
only prevailed in a single litigated manipulation case.104  When 
the 2008 financial crisis brought commodity derivatives regula-
tion under congressional scrutiny, the CFTC itself emphasized 
these lackluster results as part of a plea for broader anti-manipu-
lation powers.105  
Congress granted the CFTC’s request for enhanced spot 
market anti-manipulation authority in the Dodd-Frank Act.106  
Dodd-Frank section 753 amended CEA section 6(c) by importing 
the language of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (Exchange Act).107  Among other things, this language low-
ered the bar for establishing manipulation liability, which now re-
quires mere reckless activity rather than specific intent.108  No 
longer would the CFTC have to prove that a defendant specifi-
cally intended its activity to cause artificial prices.  The language 
comes with baggage, however:  decades of case law developed in 
the securities law context.109  In addition to enhanced anti-manip-
ulation authority, this case law smuggled in something else along 
with it: anti-fraud authority,110 the bounds of which had yet (and 
have yet) to be determined in the commodities context.  Once 
again, perceived trouble in the derivatives markets had spurred a 
legislative response, this time setting the stage for the CFTC to 
play an expansive role in the spot markets.  
103. Abrantes-Metz et. al., supra note 74, at 375-76.  Courts employ a four-part test to
find manipulation in violation of the CEA: (1) ability to influence price; (2) intent; (3) cau-
sation; and (4) artificial price.  See id. at 392.  Many common market activities meet every 
element but the second, and thus, the activities are lawful.  Id. at 385-88. 
104. CFTC, USDA Farm Credit Nominations Hearing: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 111th Cong. 13 (2009), (statement of Bart Chilton, Comm’r, 
CFTC).  In this period the CFTC did, however, settle many manipulation claims.  Id. at 52 
(testimony of Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC).   
105. See id. at 50-54.
106. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 742, 124 Stat. 1376, 1732-34 (2010).
107. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative
and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,398-
99 (July 14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).  
108. See Abrantes-Metz et. al., supra note 74, at 393-94.
109. See id. at 394.
110. See id.
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II. BITCOIN BILDUNGSROMAN: HOW BITCOIN
BECAME A COMMODITY 
Over the years, in addition to expanding and contracting the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction, primarily in the derivatives markets but re-
cently in the spot markets, Congress repeatedly amended the fed-
eral commodities laws to enlarge the definition of “commodity.”  
Today’s definition is extremely broad—broad enough to give the 
CFTC clear jurisdiction over bitcoin.111  Nonetheless, the statu-
tory definition has always been, and continues to be, narrower 
than the use of the term in common parlance.112  The advent of 
Bitcoin helps to show that assets can become, and perhaps cease 
to be, statutory commodities. An SEC official’s 2018 statement 
suggesting that “a digital asset offered as a security can [poten-
tially], over time, become something other than a security,”113 
launched a thousand commentators’ pens in the crypto-industry 
and academia.114  By contrast, the CEA’s expansive definition of 
“commodity,” combined with the greater perceived potential for 
securities regulation to hamper virtual currency innovation,115 has 
meant that scarcely any attention has been paid to the way in 
which a virtual currency can become a commodity.  Instead, the 
discourse has treated a virtual currency’s commodity status as 
111. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2010).
112. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), with Commodity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
[https://perma.cc/4UQE-EDWF] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020) (defining “commodity” broadly 
to include “an economic good” or “something useful or valued”). 
113. William Hinman, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto, Digital 
Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic)  (June 14, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/E24X-YZX4]. 
114. See, e.g., Jerry Brito, SEC Chairman Clayton Just Confirmed Commission Staff
Analysis That Found Ethereum (and Cryptos Like It) Are Not Securities, COIN CENTER (Mar. 
12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4KSJ-UC2B] (noting frequent inquiries regarding a digital as-
set’s ability to evolve beyond security status and correspondence between congressman and 
SEC chairman regarding same); AM. BAR ASS’N, DIGITAL AND DIGITIZED ASSETS: 
FEDERAL AND STATE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES (Mar. 2019) [hereinafter DIGITAL AND 
DIGITIZED ASSETS]; Hazen, supra note 12, at 510; Andrew Verstein, Crypto Assets and In-
sider Trading Law’s Domain, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2019); James J. Park, When Are 
Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the Perplexed, LOWELL MILKEN INST. POL’Y REP. 
UCLA L. & ECON. RES. PAPER NO. 18-13 (2018). 
115. See, e.g., Joseph A. Hall, Howey, Ralston Purina and the SEC’s Digital Asset
Framework, 52 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 137, 141 (2019) (“[L]abeling a digital asset 
a security for purposes of the federal securities laws is . . . effectively a death knell for the 
asset”). 
2020 NEW THINGS UNDER THE SUN 225 
fixed, with scholars, litigants, courts, and the CFTC arguing either 
that a given virtual currency is or is not a commodity.116  What the 
discussion has missed, and what bitcoin’s atypicality helps us 
conceive, is that a given asset can enter, and potentially leave, the 
CEA’s commodity definition.  Indeed, bitcoin did: Bitcoin was 
not always a commodity.  It had to become one.  
This Part follows bitcoin’s path to becoming a commodity 
and uses bitcoin’s evolutionary journey to probe the CEA’s defi-
nition of “commodity.”  Part II.A recounts how the CFTC first 
asserted and then established its jurisdiction over bitcoin and 
other virtual currencies.  Consistent with its central jurisdictional 
grant, early CFTC actions focused on bitcoin derivatives, rather 
than bitcoin itself, but these actions were necessarily predicated 
on the claim, at times stated at others tacit, that bitcoin is a com-
modity.  At the same time, the CFTC conflated bitcoin and other 
virtual currencies, setting the stage to extend (as explored in Part 
III below) its jurisdictional claim to other virtual currencies and 
the virtual currency spot markets as a whole.  Part II.B examines 
the CEA’s commodity definition through the lens of virtual cur-
rencies and shows how virtual currencies’ novelty helpfully ex-
poses interpretive difficulties lurking in the definition.  Part II.C 
takes on the most salient of these interpretive issues, identifies a 
problematic but common reading of the definition caused, in part, 
by the seemingly inelegant drafting of the statute, and endorses a 
different reading that resolves the definition’s potential ambiguity 
and redeems its wording.  
A. Gaining Purchase: The CFTC’s First Virtual Currency
Foothold 
The CFTC has claimed jurisdiction over bitcoin and other 
virtual currencies since at least 2014.117  CFTC authority depends, 
in every case, on the existence of a commodity, whether that com-
modity underlies a derivative contract (in the derivatives markets) 
116. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 12, at 502 n.35 (“[C]rypto currencies clearly fall
within the definition of commodity”); Verstein, supra note 114, at 20 (any given virtual cur-
rency “highly likely” to be a commodity); Prentis, supra note 12, at 626 (arguing for bitcoin’s 
classification as a commodity based on its use); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
117. Massad Testimony, supra note 27.
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or is the subject of fraud and manipulation (in the spot markets).118  
The CFTC began establishing this threshold with respect to vir-
tual currencies in 2014, when it first pointed to bitcoin as a spe-
cific example of a virtual currency and asserted that virtual cur-
rencies meet the definition of “commodity” set forth in §1a(9) of 
the CEA.119  In a series of uncontested administrative proceedings 
that followed, the CFTC shored up its claim to bitcoin markets, 
filing and settling actions in connection with the operation of an 
unregistered bitcoin option contracts trading facility,120 wash trad-
ing,121 and facilitating off-exchange leveraged commodity trans-
actions,122 all in violation of the CEA and CFTC regulations.  
These proceedings laid the groundwork for a more expansive 
assertion of oversight authority by the CFTC: first, by solidifying 
bitcoin’s status as a commodity (and thereby the CFTC’s author-
ity in the bitcoin spot as well as derivatives markets) and, second, 
by consistently equating bitcoin and “other virtual currencies.”123  
To be sure, each action predominantly involved bitcoin deriva-
tives, as opposed to other virtual currencies or spot market trading 
(in bitcoin or otherwise).  But the CFTC has authority over bitcoin 
derivatives only if bitcoin is a commodity.  And while bitcoin’s 
118. See, e.g., PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES 
REGULATION 7 (2004) (“Since federal regulation of derivatives pivots on whether a com-
modity is involved, it is necessary first to define the term.”); see also Salomon Forex, Inc. v. 
Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 972 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he CEA uses the term ‘commodity’ in setting 
the jurisdiction of the CFTC”).  But see Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter 
Wise Commodities, LLC, 749 F.3d 967, 974 (11th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing between 
CFTC’s “statutory authority, its ‘jurisdiction,’” and the subject matter jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts). 
119. Massad Testimony, supra note 27. At this point, the legal literature has given
ample and able treatment to Bitcoin’s background and underlying technology.  For a layper-
son’s introduction to the technology and a bird’s eye view of the legal landscape, see 
PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF 
CODE (2018). 
120. Coinflip, supra note 28, at *1.
121. TeraExchange, supra note 29, at *1.
122. Bitfinex, supra note 30, at *1.
123. See, e.g., Massad Testimony, supra note 27 (“While the CFTC does not have pol-
icies and procedures specific to virtual currencies like bitcoin, the agency’s authority extends 
to futures and swaps contracts in any commodity.”); Coinflip, supra note 28, at *2 (“Bitcoin 
and other virtual currencies are . . . properly defined as commodities.”); Bitfinex, supra note 
30, at *5.  
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commodity status is now indisputable,124 for the first years of its 
existence it almost as clearly was not a commodity, as we will 
see.  This did not prevent the CFTC, in the days before bitcoin’s 
status had transformed, from making premature claims to the vir-
tual currency.  Nor has it prevented the CFTC, now that bitcoin’s 
status as a commodity has solidified, from using this firm ground 
as a steppingstone to reach other virtual currencies and to probe 
the outer bounds of its oversight authority in the commodity spot 
markets.  In a striking example of regulatory creep, elaborated on 
in Part III below, virtual currencies have become both the test case 
for the extent of this authority and a tool the CFTC uses to carve 
out a wider expanse of territory than Congress likely intended 
with the passage of §753 of Dodd-Frank.  
The precedents established by regulator statements and set-
tlement orders, though not carrying the force of a court decision, 
acclimate lawyers, courts, and market participants to the idea that 
first bitcoin and then all other virtual currencies are commodities, 
moving the baseline of the argument, and contribute to the slow 
creep of a regulator’s expanding jurisdiction.  They are also more 
easily produced and controlled than a court case. Indeed, one ben-
efit of settling rather than litigating early cases, from a regulator’s 
perspective, is the opportunity to make unsupported statements 
about the law, without opposition from the settling parties, that by 
the dint of time come to be the accepted view.125  The CFTC’s 
early settlement orders offer next to no analysis in support of the 
claim that bitcoin qualifies as a “commodity” under CEA §1a(9), 
much less other virtual currencies, instead asserting, in near-con-
clusory fashion, that “[t]he definition of a ‘commodity’ is 
broad.”126  Such precedent, tenuous as it may be, sets the baseline 
124. David E. Aron and Matthew Jones, The CFTC’s Characterization of Virtual Cur-
rencies as Commodities: Implications under the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Reg-
ulations, 38 No. 5 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. NL 1 (May 2018). 
125. See, e.g., DIGITAL AND DIGITIZED ASSETS, supra note 114, at 72 (speculating that
CFTC took unusual step of not imposing monetary penalty in Coinflip because case was 
aimed at “providing notice to the market of [CFTC’s] assertion of enforcement authority 
over virtual currencies.”). 
126. Coinflip, supra note 28, at *2 (internal citations omitted); Bitfinex, supra note 30,
at 5; TeraExchange, supra note 29, at *3 n.3 (respondent consented to the application of the 
CEA); Complaint at ¶ 12, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., 
No. 17-7181 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017). 
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of the argument in the CFTC’s favor, begins immediately to affect 
the behavior of market participants, and accustoms entrepreneurs 
and attorneys alike to the possibility that bitcoin and all other vir-
tual currencies are at risk of regulation by the CFTC.  
B. Statutory Commodities: A Rose Is a Rose Is a Rose in
which Contracts for Future Delivery Are Presently or in
the Future Dealt in 
CEA §1a(9)’s definition of a commodity is worth quoting in 
full—and merits more attention than one might typically give to 
block quotations of statutory text127—not the least for its Linnaean 
attempt to inventory the things of the world: 
The term “commodity” means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, 
barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, 
eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, 
fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut 
oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal, 
cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, live-
stock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and all 
other goods and articles, except onions (as provided by sec-
tion 13-1 of this title) and motion picture box office receipts 
(or any index, measure, value, or data related to such re-
ceipts), and all services, rights, and interests (except motion 
picture box office receipts, or any index, measure, value or 
data related to such receipts) in which contracts for future 
delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.128  
The definition of a “commodity” is broad indeed.129  Its strange 
and inconsistent specificity—Why enumerate varieties of fats and 
oils but not varieties of livestock?  Is butter not a “livestock prod-
uct”?  Why except onions?130—calls out for political and 
127. See, e.g., MARK HERRMANN, THE CURMUDGEON’S GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW
7-8 (2006).
128. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2010).
129. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  It is also, however, narrower than the
dictionary definition of commodity.  Strange, then, that courts and commentators reach for 
the dictionary.  See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 
3d 213, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Prentis, supra note 12, at 626. 
130. In the 1950s, Vince Kosuga, an onion farmer and commodities trader, cornered
the onion market.  Owning, effectively, all the onions in the United States, Kosuga got rich 
overcharging for the onions he could sell.  Then he shorted the market before flooding it with 
his oversupply, profiting from his short positions as the onion market crashed.  Keith Romer, 
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historical context, without which the definition seems arbitrary, 
even nonsensical.  
The short explanation for the patchwork state of the defini-
tion is that it was sewn together over many years.  The federal 
commodities laws began with a slender definition of the underly-
ing commodities to be regulated.  The laws’ first constitutional 
iteration, the Grain Futures Act of 1922, limited federal jurisdic-
tion to corn, wheat, oats, barley, rye, flax, and sorghum.131  For 
the next fifty years, Congress engaged in the hopeless, endless 
task of cataloguing132 the world’s commodities, adding to the list 
whenever futures trading developed in a good it wished to regu-
late.133  This ad hoc approach proved too tedious even for Con-
gress, and in 1974, legislators took a new tack. Under the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Congress 
created the CFTC and vested it with the authority to regulate fu-
tures markets overlying not only the already-enumerated com-
modities but also commodities falling into two broad catchalls: 
(1) “all other goods and articles” and (2) “all services, rights, and
interests” for “which contracts for future delivery are presently or
in the future dealt in.” 134  The definition has been amended since,
but not since 2010135 and, it will be noted, not to name “virtual
currency,” “cryptocurrency,” “digital assets,” or any of the other
various nomenclatures that might encompass bitcoin or the virtual
The Great Onion Corner and the Futures Market, NPR (Oct. 22, 2015) 
[https://perma.cc/SPR8-JNBW].  Today, the CEA bans trading in onions futures and the spot 
price for onions is, as a result, extremely volatile.  Mike Bird, The World Cries Out for Onion 
Derivatives, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2019), [https://perma.cc/J5P8-SX4M]; Felix Salmon, 
Trading in Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2010), [https://perma.cc/P6QR-X9JL]. 
131. Grain Futures Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 998.
132. See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK; OR THE WHALE (2008) (ebook),
[https://perma.cc/85CD-S8H9] (“It would be a hopeless, endless task to catalogue all these 
things. Let a handful suffice.”).  
133. See Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1491 (adding cotton, rice, mill
feeds, butter, eggs and Irish potatoes); Commodity Exchange Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 205 (add-
ing wool tops); Commodity Exchange Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1059 (adding fats and oils, cot-
tonseed, cotton seed meal, peanuts, soybeans, and soybean meal); National Wool Act of 
1954, Pub. L. No. 83-690, 68 Stat. 910, 913 (adding wool); Commodity Exchange Act of 
1955, Pub. L. 84-174, 69 Stat. 375 (adding onions, later excised by the Onion Futures Act, 
Pub. L. 85-839, 72. Stat. 1013); Commodity Exchange Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-258, 82 Stat. 
26 (adding soybean meal, livestock, and livestock products). 
134. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra at note 118, at 8-9 (reading futures requirement to ap-
ply throughout). 
135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
230 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:2 
currency projects the followed it.136  It’s left to the catchalls, there-
fore, to capture virtual currencies.  
Any attempt to apply the statute to a given virtual currency 
raises five interpretive questions:  
First, which of the catchalls catches virtual currencies?  That 
is, is a virtual currency (1) a good or article or (2) a service, right, 
or interest?  The CFTC has at different times taken different po-
sitions on this issue,137 and its resolution matters for the second 
interpretive question.  
Namely, second, does what I will call the “futures require-
ment” apply to both catchalls, or only to “all services, rights, and 
interests”?  If the commodity definition requires futures trading 
only in services, rights, or interests, and not in goods or articles, 
then a determination that virtual currencies are goods would 
lower the first hurdle to CFTC jurisdiction.  Any “good,” regard-
less of the existence of future contracts in it, would be a commod-
ity.138  
Third, to the extent the futures requirement applies to which-
ever catchall catches virtual currencies, what sort of futures 
count?  Do unregulated international futures suffice, or must reg-
ulated domestic futures exist?139  
136. See, e.g., Heath Tarbert et al., Leaders of CFTC, FinCEN, and SEC Issue Joint
Statement on Activities Involving Digital Assets, SEC Public Statement, n.4 (Oct. 11, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/Y8BT-Q3ST] (“Digital assets may be referred to in the industry by labels 
such as ‘virtual assets,’ ‘crypto-assets,’ ‘digital tokens,’ ‘digital coins,’ ‘digital currencies,’ 
‘cryptocurrencies,’ and ‘convertible virtual currencies.’ Financial activities involving digital 
assets may also be referred to as ‘initial coin offerings’ or ‘ICOs.’”). 
137. Compare, e.g., Coinflip, supra note 28, at *2 (suggesting that bitcoin is captured
by “all services, rights, and interests”) with Brief of CFTC in Support of Preliminary Injunc-
tion and Other Relief, at *11, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. 
Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y.), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-361) [hereinafter CFTC McDonnell Brief] (CFTC arguing that 
bitcoin and litecoin (a bitcoin clone) fall into both “rights and interests” and “all other goods 
and articles”) and Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Crater and Relief Defendants’ Motion 
to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 7, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big 
Coin Pay, Inc., No. 18-CV-10077-RWZ, at 7 (D. Mass. 2018) [hereinafter CFTC MBC 
Brief] (CFTC arguing that virtual currencies are “goods”). 
138. Compare CFTC MBC Brief, supra note 135, at 8 (“[T]he modifier . . . ‘presently
or in the future dealt in,’ applies as a matter of syntax, punctuation, and grammar, only to 
‘services, rights, and interests.’”) with DIGITAL AND DIGITIZED ASSETS, supra note 114, at 
79 (suggesting “that Congress did not intend to give the CFTC authority over commodities 
that would have no connection to a futures market”). 
139. Compare, e.g., Thomas A. Russo & Edwin L. Lyon, The Exclusive Jurisdiction
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 6 HOFSTRA L. Rᴇᴠ. 57, 58 n.3 (1977) (“It
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Fourth, to the extent the futures requirement applies, at what 
point must the futures exist?  Must futures trading exist today?  
With reasonable likelihood in the near future?  It is enough that 
the futures be merely conceivable?140  
Finally, to the extent the futures requirement applies, do 
bitcoin futures satisfy the requirement for all virtual currencies?  
Or only for bitcoin, leaving other virtual currencies outside of the 
definition—and the CFTC’s jurisdiction—until virtual currency-
specific futures develop or, at a minimum, until they are shown to 
be sufficiently similar to bitcoin to justify finding bitcoin futures 
to satisfy the futures requirement in their case? 
The novelty of virtual currencies—rare anymore in the com-
modity world—helps expose these definitional fault lines.141  The 
following section will use virtual currencies to focus on the final 
two questions: When must futures exist (Today? In the future?) 
and should futures in one unenumerated commodity (bitcoin) 
meet the futures requirement for potential commodities with sim-
ilar characteristics (other virtual currencies)?142 
C. How Bitcoin Teaches Us to Interpret the Commodity
Definition 
No one can seriously argue today that bitcoin is not a com-
modity,143 but we should not take its commodity status today as a 
is unclear whether this language pertains to contracts for future delivery domestically or 
worldwide.”) with CFTC McDonnell Brief, supra note 137, at *11 n.13 (“Any futures con-
tract, domestic or foreign, would be sufficient to bring virtual currencies within” the com-
modity definition.”). 
140. Compare United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 695 n.11 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t
is at least open to question whether the CEA requires a commodity to be the subject of a 
currently existing futures market, or merely that it be such a good for which a futures market 
could come into being.”) with CFTC McDonnell Brief, supra note 137, at *11 n.13 (“[A] 
virtual currency is a commodity even if no futures contract is traded; all the statute requires 
is that such a contract could ‘in the future’ be dealt in.”) (emphasis added).  See also infra 
notes 172-73, 180-81 and accompanying text. 
141. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (“By working through these examples of law interacting 
with cyberspace, we will throw into relief a set of general questions about law’s regulation 
outside of cyberspace.”). 
142. For our purposes, I will assume that the futures requirement applies to both
catchalls.  There is room for argument on this point but applying the requirement to both 
catchalls is consistent with my view that, as a general matter, a connection to the futures 
markets acts as a limit on both the commodity definition and CFTC jurisdiction. 
143. See, e.g., Aron & Jones, supra note 124, at 1.
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vindication of the CFTC’s position that bitcoin was a commodity 
in 2014.  With respect to bitcoin, the debut of CFTC-regulated 
bitcoin futures144 mooted the interpretive difficulties identified 
above in connection with the CEA’s commodity definition.  
Which catchall bitcoin falls under, whether the futures require-
ment applies to that catchall, what types of futures count, when 
those futures must exist—bitcoin futures trading on the Cboe Fu-
tures Exchange in Chicago made all these questions irrelevant for 
bitcoin.  One important question remains, however: Why?  The 
facile answer is that contracts for future delivery in bitcoin now 
“are presently . . . dealt in,” making application of the statute to 
bitcoin as run-of-the-mill as application of the statute to natural 
gas.145  That apparently straightforward conclusion would sug-
gest, too, that the CFTC was right to claim bitcoin in 2014: If 
bitcoin futures are presently dealt in today, were they not “in the 
future dealt in” in 2014?  But would that mean that hindsight cre-
ates commodities retroactively?  Or that the commodity defini-
tion, the definition underlying regulation of the futures markets, 
asks market participants, the CFTC, and the courts to predict the 
future?  
These questions arise from a misunderstanding of the text of 
the statute, including its application to bitcoin: Bitcoin is not a 
commodity because bitcoin futures “are presently . . . dealt in” but 
because bitcoin futures are “in the future dealt in.”146  This is be-
cause, from the point of view of the Congress that enacted the 
commodity definition in 1974, today is the future.  The only con-
tracts for future delivery “presently” dealt in, in the statute’s 
terms, are futures that were trading when Congress passed those 
words into law.  Because Congress wanted to regulate more than 
futures in existence in 1974, however, and wanted to do so with-
out, as it had done in the past, passing a new amendment every 
time the market created new futures products, it also included lan-
guage to cover futures contracts created after the 1974 
144. CFTC Statement on Self-Certification of Bitcoin Products by CME, CFE and
Cantor Exchange, CFTC No. 7654-17, 2017 WL 5952205 (Dec. 1, 2017). See also Colin 
Lloyd and James Michael Blakemore, The Future Of Bitcoin Futures, LAW360 (Dec. 13, 
2017), [https://perma.cc/CG2D-CRQB].  
145. See infra text accompanying notes 185-192.
146. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9).
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amendments.  Congress, seeking to do away once and for all with 
an iterative approach to the commodity definition, amended the 
definition to capture any “thing” for which futures trading existed 
at that time (“presently”) or for which futures trading developed 
“in the future.”147  The text speaks from the position of its enact-
ment, and we are the 1974 act’s future.  
This reading helps redeem §1a(9)’s awkward wording.148  A 
statute that granted the CFTC jurisdiction over commodities for 
which futures “are presently dealt in” would have left uncertain 
the CFTC’s jurisdiction with respect to futures not yet envisioned 
in 1974.  Not wanting to limit the Commission’s jurisdiction to 
things for which futures trading existed when the statute was en-
acted, Congress added “in the future dealt in.”  This addition 
achieves Congress’s goal of preventing the statute from being fro-
zen in 1974 but creates the mirrored issue we’ve identified: If 
misread to treat the 1974 amendment’s future (today) as the stat-
ute’s “present[],” §1a(9) seems nonsensically to ask its interpret-
ers to foresee future futures.  
Fortunately, this potential ambiguity is resolved by recalling 
that the problem Congress was trying to solve was how to avoid 
adding a commodity to the definition each time new futures trad-
ing arose.  If futures trading arises in the future, Congress decided 
in 1974, at that point the underlying thing will become a com-
modity, and without Congress having to say so each time.  This 
understanding of the CEA is also consistent with the Act’s focus 
on the derivatives markets and reinforces the understanding that 
the CFTC’s jurisdiction in every instance requires a connection to 
those markets.  Given that the definition of “commodity” requires 
existing contracts for future delivery, the Commission’s authority 
always depends on the existence of a futures market, even when 
the CFTC is asserting its fraud and manipulation authority in the 
spot markets.149  
147. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9).
148. See, e.g., Russo, supra note 137, at 58 n.3 (On the breadth of the futures require-
ment, “[a] literal reading of the [statute] is not particularly helpful.”). 
149. See, e.g., JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 118, at 9 (“A fair reading of the . . .
definition suggests that, as for ‘all goods and articles . . . and all services, rights and inter-
ests,’ their status as statutory commodities does not emerge until they become the subject of 
futures trading. . . . [This] illustrates an important principle of commodities regulation: its 
interest is in a form of economic activity, rather than in the attributes or character of the 
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Finally, this understanding has a third benefit: It salvages 
§1a(9) from a reading that would render the statute absurd and the
definition superfluous.  Taken to an extreme, a reading of the
commodity definition that asks its interpreter to predict potential
futures removes any limit from the CFTC’s jurisdiction.  If the
definition requires only that contracts for future delivery of a po-
tential commodity might one day exist, that such contracts be
merely conceivable, every “thing” will meet the commodity def-
inition.  But it cannot be that any “thing” for which a future fu-
tures market can be conceived is a commodity.  If that were the
case, there would be no point in defining “commodity” at all.
Congress is of course free to enact broad definitions, but a defini-
tion without limits both serves no purpose and violates a basic
principle of statutory construction: To read any limits out of
§1a(9) would be to render it superfluous.150
III. REGULATION ABHORS A VACUUM: THE CFTC’S
CREEPING EFFORTS TO EXPAND ITS ALREADY
EXPANSIVE SPOT MARKET AUTHORITY 
The CFTC has used virtual currency to erode two potential 
limits on the new spot market authority Congress granted to the 
Commission in Dodd-Frank.  The first potential limit is the com-
modity definition explored above; the second is a reading of the 
CEA that would limit the CFTC’s spot market anti-fraud powers 
to claims of fraud-based manipulation—that is, spot market fraud 
having a manipulative effect on the derivatives markets or, at a 
minimum, on spot market prices (which, given the interconnect-
edness of the spot and futures markets noted above, is effectively 
the same thing).  Getting the commodity definition right is im-
portant not only because it underlies all of the CFTC’s powers 
broadly but also because it specifically limits the CFTC’s anti-
fraud power in the commodity spot markets (as the alleged fraud 
must involve a statutory commodity).  The commodity definition 
itself also helps reinforce the second potential limit.  The CEA 
underlying subject. The economic activity in question is futures and commodity options trad-
ing . . . .”). 
150. Cf. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 472 (1997) (in-
terpreting CEA in manner “consonant with the doctrine that legislative enactments should 
not be construed to render their provisions mere surplusage”) (citations omitted). 
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incorporates the futures markets into the definition of “commod-
ity” and thereby ought to restrict the CFTC’s authority to actions 
that may affect futures (or other derivatives) markets—the 
CFTC’s primary area of responsibility.  Instead, however, in two 
early virtual currency cases, CFTC v. McDonnell151 and CFTC v. 
My Big Coin,152 the CFTC has used virtual currency to advance 
readings of the CEA that stand to remove any appreciable limits 
from the CFTC’s anti-fraud authority in the spot markets.  
Lest one dismiss as a strawman the extreme reading of the 
CEA’s commodity definition that would find an asset to be a com-
modity so long as a futures contract in that asset is conceivable, 
Part III.A reviews a recent CFTC statement in which the Com-
mission took just this position.  The CFTC subsequently doubled 
down on the position in the virtual currency context by asserting 
jurisdiction over bitcoin (and other virtual currencies) before U.S. 
markets for bitcoin futures existed, including in federal court in 
McDonnell, where unfortunately the court did not have the oppor-
tunity to rule on the effect of the absence of such futures on the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction.  Part III.B shows a second way that the 
CFTC has used virtual currency to scrape away at the futures re-
quirement: Whereas in McDonnell the CFTC successfully exerted 
jurisdiction over bitcoin despite the nonexistence of bitcoin fu-
tures, in My Big Coin the Commission successfully exerted juris-
diction over a purported virtual currency for which futures con-
tracts did not exist, basing its claim on the existence of bitcoin 
futures.  In other words, the CFTC has taken the position that an 
asset meets the futures requirement of the commodity definition 
either where futures contracts in the asset are merely conceivable 
or where futures exist in a sufficiently similar asset.153  Finally, 
Part III.C shows how the CFTC used virtual currency to push 
aside the final candidate for a limit on its anti-fraud authority—
the requirement that the fraud bear some connection to the deriv-
atives markets. Such a limitation makes structural sense—the 
151. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 228-
29 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366, 367 
(E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
152. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d
492, 496-97 (D. Mass. 2018). 
153. See also infra notes 172-73, 180-81 and accompanying text.
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CEA first gave the CFTC anti-fraud powers in the spot markets 
as a necessary supplement to its regulatory authority in the deri-
vates markets—and prevents an absurd scenario in which the 
CFTC enjoys broad, garden variety anti=fraud power divorced 
from its core domain.  Indeed, when it issued regulations imple-
menting its post-Dodd-Frank spot market powers, the CFTC itself 
suggested it would abide by such a limit.  McDonnell and My Big 
Coin proved otherwise.  In My Big Coin in particular the CFTC 
traveled far afield from its primary expertise and core mandate, 
bringing an enforcement action in a case where no commodity 
may have existed at all.  
A. Leaving a Lot to the Imagination: The CFTC’s
Expansive Interpretation of the Commodity Definition
The CFTC’s espousal of the broad reading of CEA §1a(9)—
under which a commodity is any asset for which futures contracts 
are merely conceivable—predates the Commission’s assertion of 
authority over virtual currencies.  In a 2010 “Statement of the 
Commission” approving futures and option contracts on motion 
picture box office revenues, the CFTC saw no limit to the phrase 
“in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the fu-
ture dealt in,” interpreting it to mean “all futures trading that 
might now exist or might develop in the future.”154  In other words, 
the CFTC took the position that “Congress intended for the CFTC 
to regulate futures and options on ‘all commodities, goods, arti-
cles, services, rights, and interests which are or may be the subject 
of futures contracts.’”155  If you can imagine a futures contract on 
a thing falling into one of those enumerated categories, never 
mind whether such a contract does or will ever exist, then, in the 
154. CFTC, Approval Letter on Media Derivatives, Inc., Contracts, at 2 (June 14,
2010) (emphasis added), [https://perma.cc/6ZZ3-X8V5] [hereinafter MDEX Statement]. 
The attentive reader will have noticed that the approval of futures contracts in box office 
receipts contradicts §1a(9)’s exception of such receipts.  That exception was added by Dodd-
Frank, two months after the MDEX decision, in response to pressure from, among others, 
the Motion Picture Association of America.  Felix Salmon, Trading in Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2010), [https://perma.cc/6HT9-2UJU].  That Congress outlawed box office futures 
in part by excepting box office receipts from the commodity definition, along with Con-
gress’s similar move in connection with onions, is one more signal of Congress’s intention 
to limit commodities to things for which futures exist. 
155. MDEX Statement, supra note 154 (emphasis added).
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CFTC’s view, the thing meets the statutory definition of “com-
modity.”156  
The MDEX Statement’s reading only narrowly carried the 
day, however: Two of the CFTC’s five commissioners dissented 
precisely on the grounds that Congress could not have intended 
the statutory definition of “commodity” to be boundless.  For 
Commissioner Jill Sommers, “[w]hile the [CEA’s] definition of 
‘commodity’ is rather broad, it is not without limits.”157  Some 
things do not “fit neatly or cleanly within” the statutory definition 
because they are not, in fact, commodities, and where a thing’s 
place in the statute is not clear, the CFTC has an obligation to 
carefully consider whether it has the power to regulate it.158  And 
Commissioner Bart Chilton rejected as “circular” the argument 
that “because one can develop a futures contract, the [thing] un-
derlying [the hypothetical contract] is a ‘commodity.’”159 “Using 
this analysis,” he reasoned, “anything under the sun could be a 
commodity if you could, at some time in the future, have a futures 
contract on it.”160  Read this broadly, “the statute is meaning-
less.”161
Yet the broad interpretation of §1a(9) is in the CFTC’s insti-
tutional interest. To date the CFTC has sought to use the broad 
156. The human imagination is, of course, famously limitless.  See, Lynch, supra note
51, at 551 (“[T]he set of metrics, values, or events which can [underly a derivative contract] 
. . . are infinite.”).  Examples of exotic derivatives include those which reference the price of 
greenhouse gas emission permits, the value of mortgage-backed securities, unemployment 
rates, election results, the occurrence of terrorist attacks, and the discovery of aliens.  Id. at 
551-52.  Among the examples of futures contracts that can be imagined, but which the CFTC
is nonetheless unlikely ever to authorize, are contracts on the likelihood of the death of public
figures and of “UFOs hitting the White House.”  Commissioner Bart Chilton Dissent from
Approval of Media Derivatives Exchange’s Opening Weekend Motion Picture Revenue Fu-
tures and Binary Option Contract, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31, 593, 2010 WL 11242505
(June 14, 2010) [hereinafter, Chilton Dissent].  The world of virtual currency provides its
own example of derivatives contracts the CFTC is unlikely ever to approve—assassination
contracts on a virtual currency-based prediction market called Augur—that reportedly have
drawn the CFTC’s attention.  Matthew Leising, As Crypto Meets Prediction Markets, Regu-
lators Take Notice, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2018), [https://perma.cc/6FB9-ACEZ].
157. Dissent of Commissioner Jill E. Sommers from Approval of Media Derivatives
Exchange’s Opening Weekend Motion Picture Revenue Futures and Binary Option Con-
tracts, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,594, 2010 WL 11242506 (June 14, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter, Sommers Dissent].  See also Chilton Dissent, supra note 156.  
158. Sommers Dissent, supra note 157; see also Chilton Dissent, supra note 156.
159. Chilton Dissent, supra note 156.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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interpretation to sweep virtual currency in under its authority, and 
to use virtual currency to bolster the broad interpretation.  An ex-
panded commodity definition spells expanded jurisdiction for the 
Commission and further justification for its existence and fund-
ing.162  A definition that encompasses strange, new, high-profile 
assets attracts attention to the agency and emphasizes the defini-
tion’s purported breadth; it helps protect an agency from blame if 
things go wrong in—and makes for easy enforcement against un-
sophisticated, unsympathetic fraudsters taking advantage of—an 
ebullient new market.  By declaring future-less virtual currencies 
to be commodities, as the CFTC first did in 2014 when federally 
regulated bitcoin futures existed only in the imagination,163 the 
CFTC further normalized the view that commodities are com-
modities regardless of the existence of a futures market.  It also 
set the stage for conspicuous enforcement actions based on the 
broad view of the definition: U.S. bitcoin futures had only existed 
for a month when, in a much reported on case, CFTC v. McDon-
nell,164 the CFTC brought an enforcement action alleging bitcoin-
related violations of the CEA between January 2017 and January 
2018.165  
The McDonnell defendant broadly contested the CFTC’s ju-
risdiction over virtual currencies166 but missed an opportunity to 
put before a federal court the more difficult question of the limits 
of the definition of commodity that we have been discussing.  Not 
only does a maximalist reading of §1a(9), as noted above, make 
for easier enforcement, but enforcement against unsophisticated 
162. See William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives:
The Need for a Comparative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 121-22 (1995) (noting 
regulators’ incentives to please Congress by, among other things, expanding their domain).  
163. Massad Testimony, supra note 27.  Note that Chairman Massad pointed to bitcoin
derivatives, in existence at the time, as one area of the CFTC’s authority.  The derivatives in 
question, however, were not “contracts for future delivery,” as required by the plain language 
of §1a(9), but bitcoin swaps and options.  7 U.S.C. §1a(9) (2010); see also CFTC Back-
grounder, supra note 100; TeraExchange, supra note 29, at *1-2.  Note, too, that the CFTC 
has suggested that “contracts for future delivery” in bitcoin dealt in on foreign boards of 
exchange suffice for purposes of the definition.  See CFTC McDonnel Brief, supra note 137, 
at 12. 
164. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 222
(E.D.N.Y 2018). 
165. Complaint at 2, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F.
Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-0361). 
166. See McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 217.
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fraudsters can also make it easier to obtain court orders supporting 
a maximalist reading—in particular where defendants opt to pro-
ceed pro se.  The occasional tendency of enforcement actions to 
pit a government litigator against a pro se defendant is, in this 
sense, in the regulator’s interest, though it means courts are less 
likely to hear the best arguments on both sides of an issue.167  In 
the case of McDonnell, while federally regulated futures existed 
when the CFTC filed the case, for nearly all of the period in which 
the CFTC alleged misconduct they did not.168  The court should 
have been asked to consider the point at which bitcoin became a 
“commodity” under the CEA—whether due to bitcoin futures 
available abroad169 or by finding that bitcoin futures were “in the 
future dealt in” at some point in 2017.  It might have made a dif-
ference: The district court relied in part on the quite recent exist-
ence of futures trading in bitcoin to conclude that bitcoin met the 
statutory definition of a commodity, despite the fact that those fu-
tures had been certified only a little over a month before the CFTC 
filed its complaint.170  As it stands, bitcoin’s novelty, its suspect 
status, and the unrepresented, unsophisticated, and unsympathetic 
defendant the CFTC chose to pursue in McDonnell all helped the 
CFTC succeed in bringing an action advancing its position in 
MDEX that an asset is a commodity so long as its futures can be 
imagined.  
167. See, e.g., Memorandum, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions
for Final Judgment and Injunction at 6, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 
287 F. Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y 2018) (No. 18-CV-361) (“The litigation has been particularly 
difficult to administrate because McDonnell has appeared pro se despite various attempts of 
the court to explain why he needs counsel. He has appeared in court intermittently.”); Com-
plaint at 1, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., 2017 WL 
4228737 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-7181) (pro se defendant in CFTC suit alleging bitcoin 
Ponzi scheme not involving futures contracts).  Cf. James Blakemore, Counsel’s Control 
over the Presentation of Mitigating Evidence During Capital Sentencing, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
1337, 1357-59 (2013) (discussing, in the criminal context, the paramount importance of in-
volvement of counsel).  
168. See McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 222; Complaint at 1, McDonnell 287 F. Supp.
3d 213 (No. 18-CV-0361). 
169. See CFTC McDonnell Brief, supra note 137, at 12 n.13 (suggesting “contracts for
future delivery” in bitcoin dealt in on foreign boards of exchange suffice for purposes of the 
definition).  
170. See McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 222, 227-28. (noting CFTC-regulated bitcoin
futures and the principle that existence of futures market underlies CFTC jurisdiction). 
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B. My Big Coin Has No Futures: Why Bitcoin’s Should
Not Be Enough 
Virtual currency’s usefulness to the CFTC as a way to 
stretch—and even erase—the boundaries of the commodity defi-
nition did not end with bitcoin. Bitcoin was not born a commod-
ity.  It became one, sometime between its 2008 genesis and the 
December 2017 certification of the first federally regulated 
bitcoin futures.171  Tracing how it did so helps trace the outside 
bounds of the CFTC’s authority.  As a completely new form of 
asset in which futures trading had not had the opportunity to de-
velop, bitcoin gave the CFTC the chance to promote the idea that 
its jurisdiction is based in all things, not solely things underlying 
futures contracts. Now that bitcoin’s status as a commodity is 
clear,172 it is no longer, in that sense, useful to the CFTC.  But 
bitcoin, of course, is far from alone.  Thousands of other virtual 
currencies exist, the majority of which do not underlie U.S.-regu-
lated futures contracts, and new virtual currencies with exotic fea-
tures could be created at any moment.173  As an alternative to its 
argument that CEA §1a(9) does not require futures trading to find 
a commodity, the CFTC has taken the position that bitcoin futures 
are enough to bring all other virtual currencies within the defini-
tion. In this way, the CFTC has begun to use virtual currencies in 
a different way to say the same thing it said in bitcoin’s case: The 
commodity definition’s futures requirement—at least for virtual 
currencies going forward—is no requirement at all.  
The CFTC has claimed virtual currencies as commodities for 
as long as it has claimed bitcoin, issuing statements and obtaining 
rulings that conflated, with inadequate support, bitcoin’s regula-
tory status with that of other virtual currencies.  From the begin-
ning, the agency saw bitcoin as a specific example of a general 
category—virtual currencies—within its purview.174  But, as we 
171. Lee Reiners, Bitcoin Futures: From Self-Certification to Systematic Risk, 23 N.C.
BANKING INST. 61 (2019). 
172. See, e.g., Aron & Jones, supra note 124.
173. Nathan Reiff, The 10 Most Important Cryptocurrencies Other Than Bitcoin,
INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/S8GX-A2EG] (including ether, XRP, lite-
coin, tether, and Monero). See also CoinMarketCap, coinmarketcap.com (listing more than 
2,500 individual cryptocurrencies).  
174. Massad Testimony, supra note 27.  See also Justin S. Wales, Richard J.
Ovelmen, Bitcoin Is Speech: Notes Toward Developing the Conceptual Contours of Its 
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have seen, that self-serving interpretation of the law was not self-
evidently correct, not least because the CFTC claimed bitcoin and 
other virtual currencies long before federally regulated futures 
contracts existed for those assets.175  In its first settled enforce-
ment actions, the CFTC stated that bitcoin’s commodity status 
and that of other virtual commodities were one and the same.176  
And in McDonnell, the CFTC obtained a ruling that not only 
bitcoin, but all virtual currencies are commodities subject to the 
CEA.177  The McDonnell court should not have purported to go so 
far. Only the commodity status of bitcoin and litecoin, a bitcoin 
clone, were squarely before the court.178  Moreover, just as the 
McDonnell court did not reckon with the absence of U.S.-regu-
lated bitcoin futures during most of the time over which the CFTC 
sought to impose its authority, despite ostensibly basing CFTC 
jurisdiction on the existence of a futures market in bitcoin,179 the 
court also did not have opportunity to consider what effect the 
lack of futures contracts for other virtual currencies might have 
on their commodity status.180  Said differently, if futures contracts 
for one of the thousands of other virtual currencies do not exist, 
is the virtual currency nevertheless, consistent with the CFTC’s 
Protection Under the First Amendment, 74 U. Miami L. Rev. 204, 266 (2019) (noting a 
general tendency among regulators not “to draw distinctions among different types of cryp-
tocurrencies”). 
175. Notably, in October 2019, CFTC Chairman Heath P. Tarbert claimed the virtual
currency ether, arguably the second most important virtual currency after bitcoin, as a com-
modity, despite the current lack of ether futures.  According to Chairman Tarbert, ether is a 
commodity because it is not a security (implying that anything that is not a security is a 
commodity) and because it is a commodity, the CFTC will soon greenlight ether-based fu-
tures contracts.  Press Release, CFTC, Chairman Tarbert Comments on Cryptocurrency Reg-
ulation at Yahoo! Finance All Markets Summit (Oct. 10, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3TN8-
RTV3].  This analysis puts the cart before the horse.  Futures trading is not permitted to debut 
because something is a commodity; instead, futures trading, as a statutory matter, creates the 
commodity.  Unless bitcoin futures are shown to meet the statutory definition of “commod-
ity” with respect to ether, the absence of ether futures contracts suggests that ether is not a 
commodity and will not become one unless and until trading in ether-based futures begins.   
176. Coinflip, supra note 28, at *2 (“Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are . . .
properly defined as commodities.”); Bitfinex, supra note 30, at * 5.  
177. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 227-
28 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
178. See id. at 232.
179. See id. at 227-29.
180. See generally id.
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stated position, a “commodity” under §1a(9), and subject to the 
CFTC’s oversight, thanks to bitcoin futures?  
CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. asked a federal court to de-
cide this very question: Did the virtual currency in question, a vir-
tual currency called My Big Coin (MBC), come within the com-
modity definition by virtue of the existence of bitcoin futures and 
despite the lack of futures traded in MBC?181  In My Big Coin, the 
CFTC alleged that the defendants had used false statements to in-
duce customers to buy MBC and had invented and artificially 
changed the price of MBC to make it appear that MBC was being 
actively traded.182  In response, the defendants pointed to the lack 
of MBC-specific futures to argue that MBC did not meet the stat-
utory definition of commodity and that, as a result, the CFTC’s 
authority did not reach their alleged conduct.183  The CFTC re-
plied that contracts for future delivery of virtual currencies ex-
isted—bitcoin futures—and that therefore the specific virtual cur-
rency MBC was a commodity.184  
The court sided with the CFTC, giving CEA §1a(9) a dubi-
ous reading that threatens to render the commodity definition a 
nullity.185  On the theory that the statute defines commodities by 
category rather than “by type, grade, quality, brand, producer, 
manufacturer, or form,” the court reasoned that Congress in-
tended the futures requirement to apply to general categories like 
“livestock.”186  In other words, if futures traded in one form of 
livestock but not another—swine, say, but not cattle—cattle 
would nonetheless qualify as a commodity on the basis of swine 
futures.  With respect to MBC, the theory goes, futures contracts 
existed for the category “virtual currencies” by virtue of bitcoin 
futures and, as a specific example of a virtual currency, MBC 
qualified as a commodity as a result.  This textual reading, how-
ever, proves both too little and too much.  Too little, because the 
statute does not always speak categorically (surely “butter” and 
181. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d
492, 495-96 (D. Mass. 2018). 
182. Id. at 494.
183. Id. at 496.
184. Id. at 496-97.
185. See id. at 496-98.
186. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d, at 496-97.
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“eggs” are “livestock products,” yet the statute lists all three).  
Too much, because “virtual currencies,” unlike “livestock,” do 
not appear in the statute.  Virtual currencies, as we have seen, 
must therefore fall under a catchall category like “goods.”  And, 
taking goods as an example, for reasons elaborated above, it can-
not be that a futures contract in one good makes all goods com-
modities.187  Instead, the statute means what it says: Only goods 
in which futures contracts are dealt are commodities; other goods 
are not.  
The problem then becomes one of choosing a level of gen-
erality for the class of assets underlying the contracts for future 
delivery necessary to the commodity definition.  “Goods” plainly 
is too broad a category.  The My Big Coin court’s chosen analogy 
(the best the “scant caselaw on this issue” had to offer) was natu-
ral gas.188  In support of its holding that “virtual currency” is an 
appropriate category under §1a(9), the My Big Coin court cited 
cases holding natural gas to be a sufficiently narrow category for 
the definition.189  Natural gas is an asset, like virtual currencies, 
not enumerated in §1a(9), and the cases cited by the court consid-
ered whether futures contracts in natural gas delivered at one lo-
cation sufficed to bring natural gas delivered at another location 
within §1a(9)’s commodity definition.190  But the outcome in 
those cases is as obvious there as it is unpersuasive here.  As noted 
in the natural gas cases,191 natural gas delivered at one location is 
fungible with natural gas delivered at another, and §1a(9) requires 
only that contracts for future delivery exist, not that they exist 
187. See id.
188. Id. at 497.
189. Id. at 497-98.
190. Id. at 497 (internal citations omitted); United States v. Futch, 278 F. App’x 387,
395 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Valencia, No. Civ.A. H-03-024, 2003 WL 23174749, 
at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003), vacated in part on other grounds, No. CRIM.A. H-03-024, 
2003 WL 23675402 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 394 F.3d 352 (5th 
Cir. 2004).  
191. United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 695 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t would be pecu-
liar that natural gas . . . ceases to be a commodity once it moves onto some other locale. . . . 
[T]he actual nature of the ‘good’ does not change.”); Futch, 278 F. App’x at 395 (finding
“frivolous” the argument that natural gas is not a commodity when delivered to a location
other than that specified in natural gas futures contracts, as the contractual specification of
delivery “does not in any way limit the type of commodity in question, natural gas.”); Va-
lencia, 2003 WL 23174749, at *3, *8 (“All agree that natural gas is essentially fungible.”).
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everywhere the commodity is to be delivered.  The level of gen-
erality makes sense—natural gas futures are natural gas futures, 
wherever the underlying gas is delivered—whereas a higher level 
of generality—extractive resources, say—would be less convinc-
ing.  That is, the courts in the natural gas cases would more likely 
have rejected an argument that gold futures, or even oil futures, 
would have pulled natural gas into the commodity definition on 
the basis that all such assets are pulled from the ground.  None-
theless, the My Big Coin court found the analogy persuasive.  
Virtual currencies are new and complex enough that they are 
still not well understood, making the appropriate level of gener-
ality difficult to determine.  But there’s no clear reason to think 
that bitcoin’s categorization should bear decisively on that of 
other virtual currencies. Bitcoin itself is unlike any asset that 
came before it.192  And while other virtual currencies may share 
some characteristics with bitcoin, typically in particular some as-
pects of their underlying technology, it has yet to be shown that 
their similarities warrant treating futures in bitcoin effectively as 
futures in all virtual currencies.  Virtual currencies number in the 
thousands, have diverse designs and uses, and generally are not 
fungible among themselves.193  If fungibility is the test, virtual 
currencies fail it.  Fungibility aside, the variety among virtual cur-
rencies is at least as great as among extractive resources.194  At a 
minimum, consistent with Congress’s purpose in drafting §1a(9) 
in the manner it did, courts should ask whether a potential com-
modity has the potential to substantially influence the price of 
contracts for future delivery that are presently dealt in.  This 
standard, it is worth noting, would have required the same 
192. See Katie Szilagyi, supra note 12, at 16 (“Bitcoins are something new: they have
no physical analogues.”).  See also CFTC, Advisory with Respect to Virtual Currency De-
rivative Product listing, CFTC Staff Advisory No. 18-14 (May 21, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/6R2W-Y6GE] 
(“Virtual currencies are unlike any commodity that the CFTC has dealt with in the past.”).   
193. See Goforth, supra note 12, at 1 (noting existence of “more than 2000 different
active coins and tokens[,]. . .  some . . . clearly . . . designed to serve [as] . . . currencies . . . , 
many . . . with additional functionality in mind.”); see also Shakow, supra note 16, at 1, 
6(“[T]he rights and powers represented by these tokens are not uniform. As a result, there is 
no single answer as to how tokens should be treated for tax purposes.”).  But see Hazen, 
supra note 12, at 9 n.35 (“[C]rypto currencies clearly fall within the definition of commod-
ity.”).  
194. See supra text accompanying notes 191-92.
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outcome in the natural gas cases (that is, that natural gas is a com-
modity regardless of the place of delivery specified in the existing 
natural gas futures contracts), and in at least one of those cases 
the defendant was explicitly attempting to influence the futures 
markets through false reporting in the spot market.195  It may be 
the case that virtual currencies generally also have this potential 
with respect to bitcoin futures,196 but the point is that the variances 
among virtual currencies suggest that courts should consider the 
potential commodity status of each individual virtual currency.  
As we will see below, MBC is especially unlikely to have passed 
such a test.197  
In My Big Coin, in addition to holding a fraudster accounta-
ble, the CFTC landed an additional blow to the limits of the com-
modity definition, adding another yard to the agency’s creeping 
expansionist project.  My Big Coin identified no principles for de-
termining the appropriate level of generality, going forward, of a 
futures contract for a new class of assets to meet the commodity 
definition.198  The holding contributes to the erosion of §1a(9) by 
leaving the door open for ever broader category claims, all but 
inviting the CFTC or private litigants to argue that every new 
“good” or “service” is automatically a commodity because con-
tracts for future delivery trade in other goods and services.  With 
bitcoin, as we have seen, the CFTC has long claimed—and in en-
forcement actions acted on the claim—that contracts for future 
delivery need only be conceivable for jurisdiction to lie; no fu-
tures need actually exist.  In arguing that all virtual currencies, 
195. Brooks, 681 F.3d at 684-85 (defendants violated CEA by attempting to manipu-
late natural gas spot market prices in order to affect prices of natural gas futures); see also 
Futch, 278 F. App’x at 390 (defendant attempted to manipulate natural gas spot market prices 
that also affect the price of natural gas futures contracts); Valencia, 2003 WL 23675402, at 
*3 (futures contracts prices established with reference to “point of departure” spot market
index prices).  To be clear, this standard would not require that the manipulative activity
actually manipulate futures prices, only that it could. The manipulation of spot market prices
is sufficient to violate the CEA and was so even before Dodd-Frank.  7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2)
(2010); 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
196. See, e.g., Carol Gaszcz, Bitcoin Exhibits the Highest Correlation with Other Cryp-
tocurrencies – Report, THE BLOCK (March 21, 2019), [https://perma.cc/WUQ4-M8NC] (re-
porting correlation among prices of bitcoin and other virtual currencies and bitcoin’s status 
as “the bellwether of the industry”).  
197. See infra text accompanying notes 218-220.
198. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. et. al., 334 F.
Supp.3d 492, 496 (D. Mass. 2018). 
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whatever their design, purpose, and function, are commodities 
merely by virtue of the existence of futures in bitcoin, the CFTC 
makes the same argument in a new form: When it comes to new 
assets like virtual currencies, the futures requirement is no re-
quirement at all.  
C. Virtual Currency and the CFTC’s Case for Stand-Alone
Anti-fraud Power 
In addition to helping to blur limits in the commodity defi-
nition, virtual currencies have proven useful to the CFTC’s efforts 
to expand its domain in the spot markets in another way.  Specif-
ically, McDonnell and My Big Coin gave the agency the oppor-
tunity to advance an expansive view of the Commission’s power, 
following Dodd-Frank, to bring spot market fraud cases uncon-
nected to its traditional realm of oversight, the futures and deriv-
atives markets.  Dodd-Frank’s legislative history demonstrates 
that Congress had a narrower intent: to expand the CFTC’s power 
to police and deter manipulation, including fraud-based manipu-
lation, in the commodity spot markets.199  Nonetheless, the lan-
guage Congress copy and pasted from the Exchange Act is argu-
ably broader than that intent and the CFTC and, more recently, 
several courts have read it to empower the prosecution of stand-
alone fraud in addition to manipulation.200  Fears that importing 
the SEC’s §10(b) powers might unintentionally expand the 
CFTC’s powers in unforeseen ways in fact had scuttled previous 
explorations of the idea, but intervening years and a financial cri-
sis shunted those concerns aside.201  
Whatever Congress’s intent, when, in Dodd-Frank, Con-
gress incorporated the language of §10(b) of the Exchange Act 
into the CEA in the form of CEA §6(c)(1), it opened the door for 
the CFTC to explore not only its new anti-manipulation powers 
but any others the language might arguably confer.  CEA 
§6(c)(1)’s language, appearing under the title “Prohibition regard-
ing manipulation and false information,” is nearly identical to that
199. 156 CONG. REC. S5870, 5906, 5924 (daily ed. July 15, 2010).
200. See, e.g., My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 344 F.Supp. 3d at 499 (“[I]solated statements in
the legislative history . . . suggest[ing] Congress was, perhaps, principally concerned with 
combating manipulation . . . are insufficient to overcome the broad language in the statute.”). 
201. See Verstein, supra note 52, at 463-64.
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IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON, 
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO USE OR EMPLOY . . . 
IN CONNECTION WITH any swap, or a contract of 
sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or 
for future delivery . . . ANY MANIPULATIVE OR 




IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON, 
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY . . . [T]O USE OR EMPLOY, 
IN CONNECTION WITH the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . or any securities-based swap agree-
ment ANY MANIPULATIVE OR DECEPTIVE DEVICE 
OR CONTRIVANCE.203  
Building on the statutory language “deceptive device,” the SEC’s 
rule implementing §10(b)—SEC Rule 10b-5—includes language 
addressing fraud.204  When the CFTC promulgated regulations 
implementing its own new anti-manipulation authority, it walked 
through the door Congress had opened and modeled CFTC Rule 
180.1 on SEC Rule 10b-5 and the wealth of case law interpreting 
it.205  In adopting the rule, the CFTC noted that the U.S. “Supreme 
Court has interpreted [Exchange Act §10(b) to have been] . . . ‘de-
signed as a catchall clause to prevent fraudulent practices.’”206  
The CFTC saw no reason to interpret CEA §6(c)(1) differently. 
Presumptively aware of the Supreme Court’s views, the thinking 
goes, Congress, by mimicking the language of the Exchange Act, 
must not have intended to limit the CFTC’s authority to manipu-
lative acts.207  
202. 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) (2010).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2020).
205. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2020).
206. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices; Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,399 (July 
14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).  
207. 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 n.10 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263
(1952)) (“noting that where Congress borrows terms of art it ‘presumably knows and adopts 
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.’”).  
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The Exchange Act limits the SEC’s anti-fraud authority in 
ways that the CEA does not similarly limit the CFTC’s anti-fraud 
authority, and what limits potentially do exist the CFTC has set 
about undermining.  The SEC can only prosecute fraud perpe-
trated in connection with a transaction in securities.208  The CFTC 
similarly can only prosecute fraud perpetrated in connection with 
a commodity transaction, but, as we have seen, the CFTC has suc-
ceeded, thanks in large part to virtual currency, in stretching the 
already taut commodity definition so thin that it can arguably be 
draped over any “thing.”209  The final candidate for a meaningful 
limit on the CFTC’s otherwise boundless power to prosecute 
fraud is the potential that the CFTC’s anti-fraud authority is lim-
ited to fraud-based manipulation.  This limitation makes struc-
tural and historical sense: The interplay between manipulation in 
the derivatives and cash markets is the traditional rationale for the 
CFTC’s spot market enforcement powers, and the historical realm 
of the CFTC’s authority is the futures and derivatives markets.210  
Fraud-based manipulation was also, for example, the manipula-
tion prosecuted in the natural gas cases mentioned above.211  
Moreover, a contrary interpretation, at the extreme, would 
threaten to grant the CFTC “fraud jurisdiction over virtually every 
commodity sale imaginable, including everyday grocery pur-
chases”212—a ludicrous result for a relatively small agency whose 
expertise and mandate centers on the vast and incredibly complex 
derivatives markets.  
The CFTC itself, when it promulgated Rule 180.1 interpret-
ing these new powers, recognized that some limit on them was 
appropriate: 
208. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (“[W]e are satisfied
that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal rem-
edy for all fraud.”).  See also, Stassen, supra note 81 at 833 (“Even the SEC envied the 
CFTC” for the expansive definition of commodity.).  
209. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 344 F.Supp.
3d 492, 496 (D. Mass. 2018); see also supra text accompanying note 198.  
210. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
211. United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 687 (5th Cir. 2012) (defendants reported
false information regarding spot prices to manipulate index prices); see also United States v. 
Futch, 278 F. App’x 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Valencia, No. Civ.A. H-03-
024, 2003 WL 23174749, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003).  
212. See Defendant-Appellees Answering Brief at 2, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-55815). 
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[A]lthough CEA section 6(c)(1) and final Rule 180.1 give
the Commission broad enforcement authority to prohibit
fraud and manipulation in connection with a contract of sale
for any commodity in interstate commerce, the Commission
expects to exercise its authority under 6(c)(1) to cover trans-
actions related to the futures or swaps markets, or prices of
commodities in interstate commerce, or where the fraud or
manipulation has the potential to affect cash commodity, fu-
tures, or swaps markets or participants in these markets. This
application of the final Rule respects the jurisdiction that
Congress conferred upon the Commission and fulfills its
core mission and the purposes of the Act to protect market
participants and promote market integrity.213
The CFTC understood its new powers as a supplement to its tra-
ditional authority.  It would prosecute activity that threatened to 
disrupt derivatives markets or to affect the spot market price of a 
commodity.  That is, the CFTC “expected” to honor congres-
sional intent and the overall structure of the CEA by limiting its 
enforcement activity to manipulation or fraud related to futures or 
swaps markets or that has the potential, bearing in mind the inter-
relatedness of prices in the spot and derivative markets, to affect 
prices in the commodity markets.214  
The CFTC did not meet its own expectations.  As we have 
seen, in McDonnell and My Big Coin, the CFTC resisted one po-
tential limit to its fraud power—the commodity definition—by 
advancing attenuated readings of the futures requirement in 
§1a(9)’s commodity definition.  In McDonnell, the CFTC suc-
cessfully exercised jurisdiction over bitcoin-related activity be-
fore the advent of contracts for future delivery of bitcoin in the
213. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,399 (July 
14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).  
214. As the CFTC suggests, these limitations track the CEA’s findings and purpose.
See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).  Manipulation, it is worth noting, is a grave concern in the virtual 
currencies markets.  See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 12, at 521-22 (“Virtual and crypto curren-
cies are particularly ripe for manipulation.”); see also, John M. Griffin & Amin Shams, Is 
Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered?, SSRN (Oct. 28, 2019), [https://perma.cc/24UV-5FBP] (find-
ing support for the view that “price manipulation can cause substantial distortive effects in 
cryptocurrencies” and that virtual currency market prices “reflect much more than standard 
supply/demand and fundamental news”).  
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United States215 and, in My Big Coin, the CFTC undermined the 
futures requirement from a different angle, convincing a court that 
futures contracts in individual assets (bitcoin) satisfy the futures 
requirement for broad categories of assets (virtual currencies).216  
In those same cases, the CFTC also secured rulings adopting the 
Commission’s evolved position that the CEA permits the CFTC 
to bring fraud cases absent any claim that the alleged fraud af-
fected futures, swaps, or other prices.217  First, in McDonnell, fol-
lowing a federal court’s holding that CEA § 6(c)(1) only prohibits 
fraud connected to market manipulation,218 the defendant asked 
the court to reconsider its motion to dismiss.219  On reconsidera-
tion, the court upheld its order denying the motion and adopted 
the CFTC’s position that § 6(c)(1) empowers the CFTC to prose-
cute fraud absent any claims of manipulation.220  
Second, My Big Coin provides a particularly stark example 
of the distance the CFTC has traveled from its original position.  
Above we observed that, at the time of the My Big Coin decision, 
no contracts for future delivery of MBC existed.221  The CFTC, 
logically then, did not allege that the fraud in question affected 
nonexistent MBC futures.  Nor did it allege, more broadly, an ef-
fect on the bitcoin derivatives market or the spot market price of 
virtual currencies generally.  The CFTC alleged simply that the 
defendants were defrauding buyers of MBC, whom they con-
vinced to purchase MBC with misrepresentations regarding its 
uses and value.222  The CFTC’s concern in My Big Coin was not 
with the derivatives markets, or the integrity of or prices in the 
spot markets, so much as it was with protecting market partici-
pants bilked of their hard-earned money in the sale of a purported 
215. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F.Supp. 3d 213, 217
(E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
216. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp. 3d
492, 497 (D. Mass. 2018). 
217. Id. at 498; McDonnell, 287 F.Supp. 3d at 229.
218. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex Credit Co., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1173,
1185-89 (C.D. Cal. 2018), rev’d and remanded, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019).  
219. McDonnell, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 366-67.
220. Id. at 367-68.
221. See discussion supra Section III.B.; see My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp.3d at
496-97.
222. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp. 3d at 494.
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commodity.  But the Commission’s jurisdictional assertion ap-
pears to have gone farther afield than the already-contestable po-
licing of stand-alone fraud: From the pleadings it is not clear that 
MBC itself existed.223  In other words, not only was there no alle-
gation that the defendants’ fraud affected derivatives or spot mar-
kets, or that MBC was arguably not a statutory commodity; MBC 
also might not have been a commodity in the lay sense—a thing—
at all.  
In McDonnell and My Big Coin, the CFTC used virtual cur-
rency fraud as a testing ground for new theories about the breadth 
of the Commission’s post-Dodd-Frank anti-fraud authority.  Both 
cases batted away the limit that Congress and the CFTC itself ex-
pected to check the CFTC’s fraud power—a broader effect on the 
markets that make up the CFTC’s domain—but My Big Coin took 
that limit-breaching to an extreme.  In My Big Coin, the federal 
derivatives watchdog seems to have prosecuted a fantasy, an in-
vented product with no tangible connection to any of the markets 
the CFTC oversees or, for that matter, any existence in reality.  To 
be sure, the fantasy was also a fraud, and defrauded investors de-
serve protection and recompense.  But it’s not clear how the pros-
ecution of a fantasy with no connection to derivatives or spot mar-
kets “respects” congressional intent, furthers the CFTC’s mission, 
or appropriately deploys its expertise.  To make an absurd but 
telling comparison, would anyone worry that the fraudulent sale 
of horses with false horns as “unicorns” might affect the futures 
or spot prices of livestock?  Would anyone believe that the CFTC 
might appropriately prosecute such sales?  As described, that sce-
nario in fact has more to tie it to the CFTC’s area of authority than 
did MBC: it at least involves real horses.  
IV. A VIRTUAL CURRENCY USE CASE
The powers the CFTC argued for in the virtual currency con-
text have implications beyond virtual currency.  From broad pub-
lic assertions of jurisdiction over virtual currencies, to 
223. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 8, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My
Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp. 3d 492 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-10077-RWZ) (listing 
among defendants’ alleged misrepresentations defendants’ claim that MBC “was a fully-
functioning virtual currency that could be used to buy goods and services, and that was ac-
tively trading”).  
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administrative actions exercising that jurisdiction over settling re-
spondents, to successes in federal court, the CFTC lay and 
stepped from one steppingstone to another not merely to claim 
authority over virtual currencies, though those precedents of 
course further that goal.  The CFTC was also establishing increas-
ingly authoritative interpretations of the CEA’s definition of 
“commodity,” as well as its anti-fraud powers, for use in actions 
beyond the sphere of virtual currency.  No doubt the CFTC was 
concerned with tackling fraud, and no doubt virtual currency’s 
prominence in the news in recent years lent some cachet to the 
agency’s actions, but these prominent and less challenging cases 
gave the CFTC a chance to work out its arguments and lay step-
pingstones deeper in the pond to reach bigger—and more sophis-
ticated, wealthier, better lawyered—fish.  Virtual currencies’ in-
triguing novelty and complexity have made them a pliant tool for 
testing and expanding agency powers.  
Section IV.A looks beyond the CFTC’s early virtual cur-
rency actions to a non-virtual currency case in which the CFTC 
has built on the expansive theory of stand-alone fraud authority it 
tested and developed in the virtual currency arena.  McDonnell 
and My Big Coin set the stage for a major win for the CFTC in 
the Ninth Circuit, which has helped to solidify the broad claims 
the agency made in those cases.  Section IV.B concludes by wid-
ening the lens to reflect on an irony peculiar to virtual currencies: 
Virtual currencies, which arose in conscious contradistinction to 
the traditional financial system and aimed to evade government 
scrutiny and regulation, have so far ended up consistently aug-
menting the powers of U.S. regulators.  The CFTC’s use of virtual 
currency to put forward broad interpretations of its powers is not 
unique to the Commission; instead, it is an emerging trend in the 
story of bitcoin and virtual currencies generally.  
A. Beyond Bitcoin: How the CFTC Has Begun to Build on
the Expansive View of Its Anti-fraud Power Advanced
in Virtual Currency Cases 
Whether or not McDonnell and My Big Coin were appropri-
ate cases from jurisdictional and resource-allocation perspectives 
for CFTC enforcement attention, from an institutional perspective 
they were of significant benefit.  First, the CFTC secured wins 
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that, for their association with virtual currency, garnered press at-
tention and that the CFTC could use to promote the agency.224  
Second, and more importantly in the long term, in the slow accre-
tion characteristic of the common law, McDonnell and My Big 
Coin laid down the first layers of the foundation of the CFTC’s 
new anti-fraud authority, unbound from both a meaningfully lim-
ited commodity definition and, significantly, from any connection 
to price manipulation.  
In the short time since, the CFTC has already begun to build 
on this foundation.  In July 2019, in CFTC v. Monex Credit Co.,225 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first U.S. 
Court of Appeals to squarely rule on the authority of the CFTC to 
bring spot market fraud cases absent any claim of price manipu-
lation.  As in McDonnell and My Big Coin, the CFTC did not al-
lege that the purported fraud had the potential to impact prices in 
either the spot or derivatives markets.  Monex differed from 
McDonnell and My Big Coin in that it involved not virtual curren-
cies but precious metals, but the legal issue—the breadth of the 
CFTC’s anti-fraud power in the spot markets—was the same.226  
And the Monex defendants, like the McDonnell and My Big Coin 
defendants before them, argued that the CEA did not empower 
the CFTC to bring stand-alone fraud claims.227  The CFTC lost in 
the district court and appealed, and McDonnell and My Big Coin 
were decided while the appeal was pending.  On appeal, the CFTC 
was able to point to McDonnell and My Big Coin to argue that the 
district court’s limitation on the Commission’s jurisdiction was 
224. In the Enforcement Division’s 2018 Annual Report, for example, the CFTC cited
McDonnell as one of two cases representing its “significant trial victories during the past 
year.”  CFTC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, 
[https://perma.cc/3WT4-QYXU]; see also, e.g., Gabrial T. Rubin, Cryptocurrencies, Trad-
ing Scams Draw Increased Federal Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/GCS4-ZVLF]. 
225. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966,
976 (9th Cir. 2019). 
226. Compare id. at 996 with My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp. 3d at 494, and Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018).  
227. Compare Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. at 969 with My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334
F.Supp.3d at 494, and McDonnell, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 366-67.
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both “incorrect and an outlier.”228  The Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s order and, in an unprecedented ruling, permitted 
the CFTC’s expansive assertion of power in the commodity spot 
markets.229  How persuasive the appeals court found the virtual 
currency rulings, if at all, the decision does not make clear.  But, 
at a minimum, McDonnell and My Big Coin gave the CFTC the 
chance to work out its expansive jurisdictional theories and two 
precedents to build upon.  
The debate before the Ninth Circuit pitted a plain reading of 
the statute against a series of subtler, complex arguments from the 
defendants.  In the end, the appeals court gave CEA §6(c)(1) an 
alluringly simple reading. Section 6(c)(1) prohibits the use of a 
“manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with the sale of 
a commodity.230  In the Ninth Circuit’s view, to read this prohibi-
tion to require fraud to have a manipulative effect would be to 
hold “that ‘or’ really meant ‘and.’”231  The statute “means what it 
says,” the court wrote, and the authorization to prosecute “manip-
ulative or deceptive” conduct empowers the CFTC to prosecute 
fraudulent practices whether or not those practices are also ma-
nipulative.232  The defendants’ counterarguments ranged from 
textualist (plain meaning requires a reading of the statute as a 
whole; the broad reading nullifies other provisions of the CEA) 
to intent-based (the legislative history confirms that §6(c)(1) lim-
its the CFTC’s power to fraud that has the potential to manipu-
late),233 and a full treatment of these arguments is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  But most forcefully the defendants warned 
that severing the CFTC’s fraud power from manipulative effect 
would grant the Commission far-ranging enforcement authority, 
including potentially over everyday milk and egg purchases.234  
So dramatic a recalibration of governmental powers, the defend-
ants pointed out, typically requires a more explicit statement from 
228. Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex
Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-55815). 
229. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. at 977.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 975-76.
232. Id. at 976.
233. See Defendant-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 32-63, Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm’n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-55815). 
234. See id. at 2.
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Congress; Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”235  
And the Ninth Circuit did not shy away from these seemingly ab-
surd implications.  While the appeals court made clear it did not 
decide that issue—it limited its ruling to the sale of leveraged 
commodities—it also disagreed with the Monex defendants that 
inviting the CFTC into the checkout line clearly would “amount[] 
to an elephant in a mousehole.”236  After all, the court noted, “[b]y 
its terms, § 6(c)(1) applies broadly to commodities in interstate 
commerce.”  Perhaps the statute means what it says.237 
By adopting the CFTC’s view of its own powers, the Monex 
court significantly bolstered the CFTC’s burgeoning position, 
alongside the SEC, as one of the primary federal policers of fraud 
in the virtual currency markets.  The positions the CFTC advo-
cated in the virtual currency context gave it ground to stand on in 
Monex; Monex gives the CFTC new ground, going forward, to 
stand on in future virtual currency cases.  No doubt this recipro-
cal, leapfrog building of precedent will continue.  The CFTC and 
its leadership have made clear their intention to prosecute fraud 
in connection with the offer and sale of virtual currencies.238  Em-
boldened by a win at the appellate level, the CFTC is likely to 
continue to step in to supplement the SEC’s anti-fraud enforce-
ment actions in the virtual currency markets, even in cases that 
are unlikely to have any effect, manipulative or otherwise, on the 
virtual currency markets generally.  
The ruling also paves the way for the CFTC to bring claims 
of crypto-commodity insider trading.  Until recently, the federal 
commodity laws were widely understood not to provide for the 
prosecution of insider trading,239 and this made intuitive sense to 
many given the differences between securities and commodities 
235. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. at 977.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. CFTC & SEC, JOINT STATEMENT FROM CFTC AND SEC ENFORCEMENT
DIRECTORS REGARDING VIRTUAL CURRENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2018) 
[https://perma.cc/D979-XCBN]; Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are 
Looking at Cryptocurrency: At the SEC and CFTC, We Take Our Responsibility Seriously., 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018), [https://perma.cc/K4YW-SBJY].  
239. Verstein, supra note 52, at 463.
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markets.240  Recall, however, that Congress modeled CEA 
§6(c)(1) on Exchange Act §10(b), under which the SEC prose-
cutes not only fraud but also insider trading.241  When the CFTC
promulgated CFTC Rule 180.1, it had its eye on this aspect of the
amended law, stating in its comments to the final rule that “trad-
ing on the basis of material nonpublic information in breach of a
pre-existing duty . . . , or . . . trading on the basis of material non-
public information that was obtained through fraud or deception,
may be in violation of final Rule 180.1.”242  In September 2018,
the CFTC also announced that it had established an insider trading
“task force” and brought an insider trading case under CEA
§6(c)(1) and CFTC Rule 180.1.243  Private litigants, though not
the CFTC, have already attempted to bring a virtual currency in-
sider trading case under CEA §6(c)(1) and CFTC Rule 180.1.244
Monex’s holding is a prerequisite for both types of cases going
forward.
B. Digital Metal’s Irony
Early claims that virtual currency was so innovative that it 
lay outside all existing laws and regulations have proven to be 
exactly wrong.  Bitcoin, like Dodd-Frank, grew from the ashes of 
the 2008 financial crisis.245  The architects of both Bitcoin and 
240. See, e.g., Matt Levine, It’s Hard to Be an Insider in Oil, BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 24,
2018), [https://perma.cc/7HGJ-NGHD] (“Nobody has a fiduciary duty to oil. Oil has no in-
siders.”).  
241. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997) (trading securi-
ties on the basis of material, nonpublic information obtained in violation of a duty “qualifies 
as a ‘deceptive device’ under § 10(b)”). 
242. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,4003 
(July 14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).  
243. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges Block Trade Broker with Insider Trading
(Sept. 28, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7833-DR9N]. 
244. See Berk v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 18-CV-01364-VC, 2018 WL 5292244, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2018) (dismissing insider trading claim on grounds that putative plain-
tiffs’ spot market commodity transactions, absent transactions in futures contracts, is insuf-
ficient to confer private right of action under the CEA).  
245. PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY 13 (2015)
(“Cryptocurrency’s rapid development is in some ways a quirk of history: launched in the 
throes of the 2008 financial crisis, bitcoin offered an alternative to a system—the existing 
financial system—that was blowing itself up. . . . Within a few years, an entire counterculture 
movement formed around cryptocurrencies, and it has continued to revolve around them.”).  
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Dodd-Frank meant to build a bulwark against future crises but did 
so using distinct tools and according to radically different philos-
ophies.  Dodd-Frank’s drafters sought to avert future crises by 
way of regulation aimed at the supposed causes of the Great Re-
cession.246  Bitcoin and its progeny ostensibly rejected govern-
ment intervention as part of the problem.247  Dodd-Frank sought 
to restructure the financial system from within; Bitcoin sought to 
create a new one to replace it.  In the decade since the financial 
crisis, virtual currency, celebrated as innovation existing outside 
the mainstream financial system and beyond the power of gov-
ernment regulation, has begun to be domesticated by both.248  Not 
only have regulators rejected claims that virtual currency lies be-
yond the law’s domain. They have also used virtual currency to 
stretch its borders.  The great irony is that bitcoin and other virtual 
currencies, rather than resisting or escaping the traditional finan-
cial system and its regulation, are being used to expand regula-
tors’ powers.  
This is true beyond the CFTC. In the securities context, for 
example, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce has expressed anxiety 
that the SEC’s approach to digital asset regulation to date has ex-
hibited the tendency to stretch the borders of the SEC’s domain.  
By issuing no-action letters to companies that, absent the black 
mark of virtual currency, no one would have thought might be 
issuing securities, the SEC, Commissioner Peirce worries, might 
be “broadening the perceived reach of our securities laws,” rather 
246. Underregulated derivatives markets, in particular derivates speculation outside of
organized exchanges, were a primary cause of the crisis.  Stout, supra note 44, passim.  
Dodd-Frank took aim at these causes specifically, id. at 4, but also granted the CFTC less-
focused, broad new anti-manipulation powers.  Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 74, at 391- 
94.  
247. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 205-06; VIGNA & CASEY, supra note
245, at 13.  Satoshi Nakamoto, bitcoin’s pseudonymous progenitor, infamously timestamped 
the first block in the bitcoin blockchain with a January 2009 headline: “Chancellor on Brink 
of Second Bailout for Banks.”  Id. at 62-63.  Bitcoin began with a dig at the global financial 
system that seemed, at the moment of the timestamp, to be crumbling.  See id. at 63. 
248. See, e.g., VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 245, at 27. This evolution recapitulates the
early regulatory evolution of the internet. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What 
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 505 (1999) (“Many believe that cyberspace 
simply cannot be regulated.  Behavior in cyberspace, this meme insists, is beyond govern-
ment’s reach.  The anonymity and multi-jurisdictionality of cyberspace makes control by 
government in cyberspace impossible.  The nature of the space makes behavior there unreg-
ulable.”). 
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than sketching their limits.249  And it has been argued that the 
SEC’s treatment of digital assets is expanding the definition of an 
investment contract, away from the nuanced Howey test and to-
ward a “maximalist” approach that would find a security “wher-
ever investors who cannot fend for themselves need information 
and protection.”250  We have seen some of the ways in which the 
CFTC is similarly laying jurisdictional claim to virtual currency 
even as the assets’ awkward fit enables the CFTC to push out the 
boundaries of that jurisdiction.  The CFTC has effectively taken 
what one commentator memorably called “a sector created by and 
for obsessively secretive cypherpunk libertarian cranks”251 and 
transformed it into a tool for expanding the reach of the federal 
government.  
Something about virtual currency is bewitching.252  It’s nov-
elty and inscrutability are a Rorschach test.  Anti-government 
types see it as an escape from a financial system beholden to in-
cumbent banks and captured regulators.  Regulators see in its ir-
regular and shifting borders the substance of their regulation—a 
commodity, a security, money transmission.  Virtual currency 
also garners media attention.253  The pro se defendant in McDon-
nell, alive to this temptation, claimed that in settlement negotia-
tions the CFTC warned him that “The judge should take an inter-
est in this case because of recent cryptocurrency headlines.”254  
249. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r Sec. Exch. Comm’n, How We Howey (May 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/4YRN-FL3H]. 
250. Hall, supra note 115, at 141.  “And it is easy to find influential voices arguing that
SEC regulation of the technology is both inappropriate and potentially destructive of legiti-
mate commercial value.”  Id. at 138 (citing Token Taxonomy Act, H.R. 7356, 115th Cong. 
(2018)).  
251. Max Read, Facebook’s New Competition: The U.S. Dollar, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER
(June 18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/92Y2-6MLB]. 
252. See, e.g., Geoffrey F. Aronow, Is the CFTC Becoming the National Fraud Police?
The CFTC Goes All in on Policing Fraud in Virtual Currencies, 38 No. 3 FUTURES & 
DERIVATIVES L. REP. NL 1, at 5-7 (referring to the “Siren Song of Virtual Currency” in 
connection with possibility that “the CFTC could be overstepping the bounds of its jurisdic-
tion” in virtual currency cases). 
253. When, for example, the CFTC released its annual enforcement report for the 2018
fiscal year, the Wall Street Journal’s reporting led with the Commission’s virtual currency 
efforts.  Gabriel T. Rubin, Cryptocurrencies, Trading Scams Draw Increased Federal En-
forcement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2018), [https://perma.cc/U5YE-UCTC]. 
254. Declaration in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-00361), 
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Headlines, in turn, attract voter and congressional attention, and 
such attention brings funding.  Federal agencies have to justify 
their existence255 and easy wins against pro se defendants in cases 
involving captivating subject matter are a quick contribution to-
ward that goal.256  
Of course, to be clear, none of this is to say the CFTC is 
somehow acting inappropriately or unexpectedly, or that the 
CFTC does not have an important role to play in the virtual cur-
rency markets.  It’s a bad law that expects a regulator to police 
itself, not a bad regulator. Clearly, the CFTC’s anti-manipulation 
powers pre-Dodd-Frank were not up to the task.  But if Dodd-
Frank’s amendments truly gave the CFTC the limitless fraud 
power it has been advocating for, the pendulum has swung too far 
in the opposite direction.  The possibility of a federal agency’s 
unfettered power over an area perfectly within the police power 
of the states257—run-of-the-mill fraud in connection with the sale 
of goods—starts to make bitcoin’s “libertarian cranks” look like 
they have a point.  More conservatively, overbroad enforcement 
powers can deter, or even lead to the mistaken prosecution of, le-
gal activity,258 which in a nascent technological industry can ham-
per innovation.259  And the CFTC’s resources arguably can be 
adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), ECF No. 18-
1 (No. 18-00361). 
255. This is a two-edged sword.  Claiming jurisdiction over an area makes an agency
accountable for it.  See, e.g., Aronow, supra note 252, at 5-7 (noting “the political risk that, 
if a major fraud arises in an important commercial market, the Commission’s overseers in 
Congress will hold it accountable for failing to root out misconduct occurring under its 
watch.”).  But see Hall, supra note 115, at 141 (noting risk that Congress will hold SEC 
accountable for failure to push the bounds of its enforcement authority). 
256. See, e.g., CFTC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 4,
[https://perma.cc/4JNQ-E4G2] (devoting significant portion of annual report to virtual cur-
rency initiatives and victories).  See also CFTC Backgrounder, supra note 100 (noting that 
“[t]he CFTC built into its 2018 Congressional budget request additional resources to 
strengthen its technological and econometric resources to support its ability to oversee virtual 
currency derivatives”).  
257. Cf., e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854 (2014) (“In our federal system,
the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the 
remainder.  The States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good—what 
we have often called a ‘police power.’”). 
258. See Mission, Vision, and Values, CFTC, [https://perma.cc/H8T8-U6MB] (last vis-
ited Mar. 5, 2020). 
259. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 115, at 141 (“[L]abeling a digital asset a security for
purposes of the federal securities laws is . . . effectively a death knell for the asset. . . .”). 
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better used.  With respect to an agency with fewer than 700 em-
ployees, specific expertise, and limited resources, the law should 
guard against the temptation to focus on blockchain buzzwords 
and easy, headline-grabbing wins against two-bit fraudsters, ra-
ther than on, say, the futures markets or the more than $400 tril-
lion, systemically important swaps market the CFTC is charged 
with regulating.260  Under the broad reading of the CFTC’s anti-
fraud authority, these resource-allocation decisions are left en-
tirely up to the agency.  
CONCLUSION 
Just over a decade ago, a computer scientist (or scientists) 
calling himself (or herself or themselves) Satoshi Nakamoto re-
leased the Bitcoin protocol into the wild, ultimately attracting 
countless adherents around the world and sparking thousands of 
blockchain-based projects seeking to expand on aspects of Naka-
moto’s vision or technology or both.  As virtual currency markets 
have grown and its uses have multiplied, regulators, courts, and 
academics have started to query how the law should treat virtual 
currencies, beginning with how it should classify them.  The legal 
conversation’s focus on classification has both produced and 
blurred the way in which the CFTC, alongside other government 
agencies, has capitalized on virtual currencies’ legal and ontolog-
ical uncertainty to chip away at restraints on its jurisdiction and 
build a foundation for broad interpretations of its power.  In par-
ticular, settling defendants and unsophisticated, pro se defendants 
facing serious fraud allegations have lent themselves to rulings 
shoring up a reading of the CEA that would grant the CFTC po-
tentially limitless power to police fraud.  In its forays into the vir-
tual currency space, the CFTC has successfully made the case that 
its authority no longer requires any connection to the derivatives 
markets: that a commodity is literally any “thing,” regardless of 
whether futures contracts for that thing exist, and that any fraud 
committed in connection with the sale of that thing in interstate 
commerce, regardless of whether that fraud harms the commodity 
markets, falls within the CFTC’s purview.  
260. See Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 74, at 397-398; Q+A: Swaps, the Ag Com-
mittee and a $400 Trillion Market, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2010).  
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This Article also uses virtual currencies to point the way for-
ward toward fertile ground for future scholarship.  Its method was 
to show how virtual currencies help expose unsettled questions of 
commodities law and how the CFTC has used virtual currencies 
to try to settle those questions with dubiously broad readings. 
Many of these questions remain unsettled.  It remains to be seen 
whether virtual currencies represent rights or interests or are 
themselves goods, whether futures contracts dealt in on foreign 
boards of exchange satisfy the futures requirement, and how gen-
eral a category of futures might satisfy the futures requirement for 
an asset not enumerated in the commodity definition.  Future ar-
ticles will need to explore the ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding that the CFTC has stand-alone anti-fraud authority in the 
commodity spot markets, whether the court rightly decided the 
case in the first place, and what other powers enjoyed by the SEC 
Dodd-Frank might have smuggled into the CEA.  Finally, this Ar-
ticle leaves it to others to investigate the other ends to which the 
CFTC and other government actors are putting this strange new 
asset class.  
The CEA’s encounter with virtual currencies is not the first 
time the law has grappled with assets or circumstances that were 
unforeseeable at the time the law was drafted, and it won’t be the 
last.  Addressing unforeseen factual circumstances is one of the 
functions of the law.  Novel assets provide regulators with an op-
portunity to push the limits of their powers, but they also provide 
courts and scholars with a new lens through which to view famil-
iar statutes.  As entrepreneurs continue to search for virtual cur-
rency’s “killer app”—the use case that will demonstrate and en-
sure the innovation’s success—virtual currency’s novelty no 
doubt will continue to teach us new ways to read old laws.  
